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LEX SPORTIVA: THOUGHTS TOWARDS A
CRIMINAL LAW OF COMPETITIVE
CONTACT SPORT
CHRISTO LASSITER1
INTRODUCTION
A. The Kimo von Oelhoffen Hit on Carson Palmer
On January 8, 2006, in their first playoff game since 1991, the
Cincinnati Bengals, American Football Conference North
Division Champions, faced Division rivals, the Pittsburgh
Steelers, a wild card team. 2 The Steelers had beaten the Bengals
early in the season, but the Bengals resoundingly defeated the
Steelers in a late season re-match. 3 Hopes were high that a
Bengals victory over the Steelers would be the first playoff step
to an American Football Conference Championship and then to
victory in Super Bowl XL.4 However, the Cincinnati Bengals'
1 Thanks to the 2006 Oxford Roundtable on Criminal Law for many helpful
suggestions. A much shorter version of this article was originally published in the Forum
on Public Policy Online, Fall 2006 edition, which is the publishing arm of the Oxford
Roundtable. The author is grateful for the fine editing work by the editorial staff of the
St. John's Journal of Legal Commentary, especially Executive Articles Editor, Nicole
Abruzzo. Thanks also to Charles Carter, research assistant, and to Louis Bilionis, Dean
and Nippert Professor of Law at the University of Cincinnati College of Law for financial
support. All opinions expressed are solely those of the author. Send comments to
Christo.Lassiter@uc.edu.
2 See ESPN.com, Without Palmer, Bengals Struggle, Fall to Steelers,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/recap?gameId=260108004 (noting that "[t]he Steelers won
their last four to get in as a wild card.") (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
3 The Steelers won twenty-seven (27) to thirteen (13) on October 23, 2005, but the
Bengals were able to triumph over the Steelers thirty-eight (38) to thirty-one (31) on
December 4, 2005. See ESPN.com, Big Ben Returns in Steelers' 10th Straight Road Win,
http:f/sports.espn.go.comlnfl/recap?gameId=251023004 (last visited Feb. 20, 2007); see
also ESPN.com, Palmer, Bengals Hand Reeling Steelers Third Straight Loss,
http://sports.espn.go.comlnfl/recap?gameId=251023004 (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
4 Chad Johnson quipped, "It used to be Pittsburgh's time... Now it's Cincinnati's
time." See Palmer, supra note 3. In 1967, the American Football League merged into the
pre-existing National Football League [hereinafter NFL]. See ESPN.com, NFL History,
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hopes realistically ended on the second play of the game after the
opening kick off, when Pittsburgh Steeler defensive tackle Kimo
von Oelhoffen viciously tackled Cincinnati Bengal quarterback
Carson Palmer by bending his leg left against his knee joint,
tearing the anterior cruciate and medial collateral ligaments in
Palmer's left knee. 5 The Bengals managed a seventeen to seven
(17 to7) lead into the second quarter, but without Quarterback
Palmer, the Steelers ultimately pulled ahead and won the game
thirty-one to seventeen (31-17).6 Palmer left the field on a
stretcher, but no one cried foul. 7 Game officials, who may not
have seen the hit, did not penalize von Oelhoffen during the
game, nor did league officials fine von Oelhoffen after the game. 8
Cincinnati Bengal players, perhaps leery of sounding naive, did
not levy complaints about von Oelhoffen, himself an ex-Bengal,
and dirty play, at least not publicly, and at least not in the
immediate aftermath of the game. 9
http://www.nfl.comlhistory/chronology/1921-1930 (last visited Feb. 20, 2007). The NFL re-
organized into the American and National Football Conferences, which were further
subdivided into divisions. See id. Division champions, plus the two non-division champion
teams with the best records in each Conference, are invited to play in a single elimination
tournament. See id. The NFL Championship game between the winners of the National
Football Conference and the American Football Conference is popularly known as the
Super Bowl. See id. The Bengals had previously competed in Super Bowl XVI in 1982,
suffering a twenty-six to twenty-one (26-21) loss to the San Francisco 49ers; in Super
Bowl XXIII in 1989 they again lost twenty to sixteen (20-16) to the San Francisco 49ers.
SuperBowl.com, Super Bowl Recaps, http://www.superbowl.com/history/recaps (last
visited Feb. 20, 2007).
5 See The Hit: Bengals QB Palmer Vows Return; Doctor Says Injury 'Complicated',
CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Jan. 10, 2006, at 1A.
6 See id. Palmer endured reconstructive knee surgery and rehabilitation of his left
knee in time for the start of the 2006 Football Season. See Mark Curnette, Palmer Plans
to Face Packers, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Aug. 21, 2006, at 1C. Perseverance paid off as the
Bengals beat the Steelers in their first regular season re-match on the Steelers' home turf
twenty-eight to twenty (28-20) to share the lead for first place in the American Football
Conference, and leaving the Steelers second to last in the AFC North Division after Week
5 of the NFL 2006 Season. See ESPN.com, NFL Standings - 2006,
www.espn.go.com/nfl/standings (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
7 "Even though [von Oelhoffen] wasn't flagged, the NFL can still fine [him]." Geoff
Hobson, A Hit That Ends a Season and Haunts the Next, http:www.bengals.coml
news.asp?story-id=5004 (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
8 According to Dave Lapham, long-time Bengals radio analyst, "[Y]ou at least throw a
penalty flag on it. If you take more than one step toward and hit him below the waist, it's
supposed to be a penalty." See Hobson, supra note 7.
9 Although Bengals players did not levy complaints publicly, they were "not pleased
with Steelers defensive end Kimo von Oelhoffen after he dove into the side of Carson
Palmer's left knee." See Hobson, supra note 7. Carson Palmer expressed hatred for the
Pittsburgh Steelers, but still no animosity for any individual player. See Michael Silver,
The Rehabilitation of Carson Palmer, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 29, 2006, at 58.
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The nature of the hold and leverage exerted by von Oelhoffen
on Palmer's knee not only ended the quarterbacks' effort for the
game, but could very well have ended his career. Fortunately,
Palmer, who underwent very successful surgery, worked
relentlessly to speedily rehabilitate his left knee.O In Week
Three of the following year 2006, a twenty-eight to twenty (28-20)
win over the Pittsburgh Steelers, Quarterback Carson Palmer
threw four touchdown passes."l For their part, the unrepentant
Steelers maintained their smash mouth brand of football.
Pittsburgh Steeler safety Ryan Clark delivered the hardest hit in
the game, a flying shoulder pad tackle to the stomach of
Cincinnati Bengal wide receiver Chris Henry, which
momentarily stunned the player and halted play.12 Speaking to
the press afterwards, Ryan Clark all but admitted that the hit
was intended to do more than merely break-up the pass on the
specific play. He stated, "[o]ne thing about us, we are going to
run around and try to hit. When you play an offense that is good
like (the Bengals), the best thing you can do is be physical."13
Football is a physical game and playing the game aggressively is
necessary to stop an opponent from being successful; the greater
an opponent's skill, the more defined the hits must be (the bigger
they are, the harder they fall). And it is certainly an acceptable
strategy to deliver blows designed to challenge an opponent's will
to win. But somewhere in this escalation, a line may be crossed.
Though football is contested by violent confrontation, it simply
cannot be absolutely legal to violently attack opponents with the
intention to cause grievous bodily injury or death. Should von
Oelhoffen's hit on Palmer be regarded as an act of criminal
violence? The best start to answering this question is to review a
photograph of the attack as it occurred.
10 Palmer credited his dedicated rehabilitation efforts to his goal of playing in
Cincinnati's 2006 season opener. See Silver, supra note 9, at 58.
11 Palmer's four touchdown passes led the Bengals to victory. See NFL.com, Palmer,
Bengals Get Revenge vs. Steelers, http://www.nfl.com/gamecenter/recap/NFL_20060924-
CIN@PIT (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
12 Henry took the "frightening shot" at Clark, "drill[ing] him with his shoulder." See
Geoff Hobson, Palmer, Offense Find a Way, http://www.bengals.com/news/news.asp?
story-id=5527 (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
13 Mark Curnutte, Rivalry-and Antics-as Expected: Talk, Penalties, Hits: You Name
It, Game Had It, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Sept. 26, 2006, at B-1.
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The photograph shows that as von Oelhoffen dislocated
Palmer's knee, the ball had already left Palmer's hand and that
he stood completing his follow through. This is one of the most
vulnerable poses in football. 14 The NFL has long penalized 300
pound defensive lineman who come barreling into level a
quarterback in this position, especially where the tackler leads
with his helmet. 15 However, football exuberance does not a
criminal make. The photograph does not show von Oelhoffen
barreling in. The photograph shows that von Oelhoffen was not
pushed nor did he fall out of control onto Palmer. The
photograph entirely refutes the hypothesis of accident, out-of-
control athletic exuberance or even misadventure. Instead, the
photograph quite clearly shows von Oelhoffen in control and
forcing Palmer's left knee to bend sideways against the joint
tearing the anterior cruciate and medical collateral ligaments in
14 Earlier in the 2005 season, Pittsburgh Quarterback Ben Roethlisberger suffered a
hyper-extended left knee when San Diego Chargers defensive end Luis Castillo hit him in
Week Five. See Mark Curnutte, Roethlisberger-Palmer Shootout Next Week, CINCINNATI
ENQUIRER, Oct. 16, 2006, at Cl.
15 When a player tackles another player with his helmet, he receives a penalty for
"spearing" and the team loses fifteen yards. See Football Penalties,
http://library.thinkquest.org/6386/penalty.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
[Vol. 22:1
LEX SPORTIVA
Palmer's left knee. At the level of expertise necessary to become
a professional athlete, von Oelhoffen's action in bending Palmer's
knee out of joint may realistically be characterized as it appears
in the photograph, namely a knowing act, or more likely, a
purposeful act, causing grievous bodily injury. Football is a
contest of violent confrontations, but it simply cannot remain
legal to execute tactics, that purposely or knowingly risk grievous
bodily injury regardless of the legitimacy of the sporting
objective. The question is at what point, if any, does a controlled,
purposeful or knowing attack occurring during a competitive
contact sports contest cross the line to sanctionable criminal
misconduct?
B. What, if Anything is Criminal in Competitive Contact Sports?
One of the most important facets of success in competitive
contact sports such as football is the necessity to break an
opponent's will to win. The will to win may be broken with hard
physical contact. A hard hit may break the will to win
momentarily, a harder hit may break the will to win for a longer
moment, the hardest hit may break the will to win for the season,
perhaps for a career. At what point does deliberate grievous
bodily injury transcend sports to become criminal? Should the
criminal law impose limits to defeating an opponent in
competitive play? It would seem undeniable that the promotion
of legitimate vigorous competitive contact sport is a worthy goal
that should brook no interference from the criminal law. It is
equally certain, however, that purposeful or knowing criminal
objectives carried substantially to fruition should be punished in
criminal law. This is thuggery masquerading as criminal sport.
Game penalties, including loss of yards, downs or even
player ejection, as assessed by game officials, combined with
fines levied by league officials, provide adequate disincentives for
unsportsmanlike conduct, but not for criminal misconduct. The
concern here is to address criminal thuggery masquerading as
sport under the high speed, violent competitive nature of a
contact sport. Purposely or knowingly causing grievous bodily
injury or death before, during, and after games as well as play-
interrupting brawls and post game melees are not adequately
2007]
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addressed by game penalties or league fines, precisely because
they are beyond the scope of the game. Purposefully or
knowingly causing grievous bodily injury as well as play
interrupting brawls and post game melees would be viewed as
criminal conduct in any context except competitive contact
sports. Such thuggery does not, and can not be permitted to,
serve a legitimate objective in competitive contact sports.
i. Assaults: Competition Motivated Attacks Prior to
Competitive Contact Sports Play
The best way to begin the analysis in determining the
point at which a controlled purposeful or knowing attack crosses
the line to criminal misconduct is with the most dramatic
competitively motivated criminal attack in recent memory,
namely the clubbing of U.S. Figure Skater Nancy Kerrigan's
knee at the 1994 U.S. Olympic Trials.16 Kerrigan was the
reigning U.S. Figure Skating Association [hereinafter USFSA]
Champion and a favorite to win gold at the 1994 Winter
Olympics.1 7 Jeff Gillooly, the ex-husband of U.S. Figure Skater
Tonya Harding, Kerrigan's chief American rival, and his
henchmen18 admitted to the attack.19 Physically unable to
perform due to her injured knee, Kerrigan withdrew from the
U.S. Olympic trials, but was later added to the team anyway. 20
At the 1994 Winter Olympics, Kerrigan won the silver medal;
16 See Christine Brennan, Skater Attacked at Olympic Trials, WASH. POST, Jan.. 7,
1994, at Al (stating that Kerrigan "was attacked by a man wielding a blunt object after a
practice this afternoon at the U.S. Olympic trials.").
17 See Brennan, supra note 16, at Al.
18 The henchmen include Shawn Eckardt, Derrick Smith, and Shane Stant, all three
of whom received an eighteen-month sentence by the Multnomah County Court. See
Robert Fachet, Gillooly Gets Two Years in Prison, $100,000 Fine, WASH. POST, Jul. 14,
1994, at D2. Shane Stant was the actual clubber, Derrick Smith drove the getaway car,
and bodyguard Shawn Eckardt planned the attack. See Johnette Howard, Harding
Admits Guilt in Plea Bargain, Avoids Prison, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 1994, at Al
[hereinafter Harding Admits Guilt in Plea Bargain].
19 Jeff Gillooly pled guilty to one count of racketeering in connection with the plot
before a Portland, Oregon circuit court judge sitting in Multnomah County, Oregon and
received a two year sentence and a $100,000 fine. See Stephen Buckley, Gillooly Pleads
Guilty, Says Harding Approved Plot, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1994, at Al; see also Fachet,
supra note 18, at D2.
20 The USFSA is the non-governmental body which selects figure skaters to represent
the United States on behalf of the United States Olympic Committee. See Christine
Brennan, Kerrigan Picked to Join Harding for Olympics, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 9, 1994,
at Di. USFSA rules allow the USFSA to select athletes who did not compete at qualifying
trials. See id.
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Harding placed eighth. 21 Harding admitted that she was aware
of the plot after it occurred, 22  but the USFSA lacked
administrative authority to exclude Harding from competing in
the Olympics without a hearing to determine guilt.23 Months
later, the USFSA conducted a hearing and concluded based upon
circumstantial evidence that Harding knew of the plot before it
occurred and stripped Harding of her title and banned her from
USOC sanctioned events for life.24 Tonya Harding ultimately
pled guilty to obstructing the grand jury investigation into the
attack. 25
In the football analog to the Kerrigan hit, on September
13, 2006, local police in Evan, Colorado arrested Mitch Cozad, a
back-up punter for the University of Northern Colorado for
allegedly stabbing starting punter, Rafael Mendoza, in the leg as
Mendoza was exiting his car on the evening of September 11,
2006.26 Police assigned competition for the starting punting job
21 "Kerrigan made a strong argument for the gold." See Christine Brennan, For
Kerrigan, All That Glitters is Silver, WASH. POST, Feb. 26, 1994, at Al.
22 See Johnette Howard, Harding Admits Knowing of Plot After the Attack, WASH.
POST, Jan. 28, 1994, at Al (noting "Tonya Harding admitted today that she learned about
the plot to disable skating rival Nancy Kerrigan within a week after the Jan. 6 attack.").
23 The United States Olympic Committee [hereinafter USOC] had no mechanism to
bar Tonya Harding from competing in the Olympics because of procedural guarantees
available in the United States Olympic and Amateur Sports Act. Christine Brennan,
Group Begins Disciplinary Action Against Harding, WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1994, at Al; see
Serge Kovaleski, Harding Files $20M Lawsuit Against the USOC, WASH. POST, Feb. 10,
1994, at Dl; see also Christine Brennan, Deal Puts Harding in Olympics as Games Begin,
WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1994, at Al.
24 Robert Weaver, Harding's attorney stated that Harding categorically denied
allegations by her ex-husband and others and further denied Harding had prior
knowledge or participated in the attack on Nancy Kerrigan. See Christine Brennan,
Harding Stripped of Title; Banned for Life, WASH. POST, July 1, 1994, at Cl. Weaver
stated that Harding was disappointed, but not surprised that the USFSA found her guilty
because she did not appear to defend herself. See id.
25 Harding's plea agreement required her to withdraw from the American team
scheduled to compete at the 1994 figure skating world championships in Japan and resign
from the U.S. Figure Skating Association. In addition, Tonya Harding agreed to pay a
$100,000 fine (the maximum then allowed under Oregon sentencing guidelines), set up a
$50,000 fund to benefit Special Olympics, reimburse Multnomah County prosecutors
$10,000 in costs, perform 500 hours of unspecified community service, and undergo
psychiatric examination and participate in any treatment ordered by the court. See
Harding Admits Guilt in Plea Bargain, supra note 18, at Al.
26 See Pat Graham, Backup Punter May Have Stabbed Starter, WASH. POST, Sept. 14,
2006, available at htt://www.washingtonpost.comlwpdyn/content/article/2006/09/13/
AR2006091301293.html. Based on his arrest, the University of Northern Colorado
immediately dismissed Cozad from the team, the University, and on-campus housing. See
id.
2007]
ST JOHN'S JOURNAL OF LEGAL COAMaENTARY
as motive for the stabbing.27 On October 19, 2006, Weld County,
Colorado District Attorney's office filed an attempted first degree
murder charge and one count of second degree assault against
Cozad. 28
Though criminal intent is more readily acceptable in
competitor motivated attacks occurring out of play, demonstrable
criminal, purposeful, or knowing acts should make criminal
attacks occuring during play or disrupting equally out of bounds.
If a competitively motivated, intentional attack on a fellow
competitor's knee out of play clearly crosses the line to criminal
misconduct, it should be equally clear that a competitively
motivated purposely or knowing attack on a fellow competitor's
knee during play should also cross the line of criminality.
Competition motivated attacks are always out of bounds and
where a purposeful or knowing state of mind is established
beyond a reasonable doubt, criminality should not turn on
whether the attack is masked by darkness of a parking lot or the
brightness of stadium lights. Given high stakes competition, it is
inevitable that at some point in competitive contact sports, there
are risks or intentional acts that will necessarily cross the line
from mere unsportsmanlike conduct to criminal liability. And, if
it is inevitable that there is a point where a controlled,
purposeful or knowing attack in -competitive contact sports
crosses the line to criminal misconduct, our next step is to
consider athletic scenarios where purposeful or knowing attacks
are seemingly in play.
ii. Attackles: Competition Motivated Attacks During
Competitive Contact Sports Play
In addition to off-the-field attacks like the Tonya Harding
hit on Nancy Kerrigan, three additional instances of obvious
thuggery come readily mind as going beyond the pale of mere bad
sportsmanship to cross the line to potential criminal misconduct.
First there is acting with purposeful or knowing intent to cause
27 See Kelly Lyell, Football Roundup: Competition May Be Motive in Stabbing of
Northern Colorado Punter, TUCSON CITIZEN, Sept. 14, 2006, available at
http://www.tucsoncitizen.com /altss/printstorycollege26154.
28 See Pat Graham, Punter Faces Attempted Murder Charge, Oct. 20, 2006,
http://www.boston.com/sports/col eges/footballarticles/2006/10/20/punter-faces-attempted
-murder charge/. If convicted, Cozad could face up to forty-eight years in prison. See id.
[Vol. 22:1
LEX SPORTIVA
grievous bodily injury or death occurring during, but grossly
exceeding the limits of fair play. Second there is acting with
purposeful or knowing intent to aggravate a pre-existing injury
to debilitate an athlete completely and perhaps permanently,
again occurring during, but grossly exceeding the limits of fair
play. Third, and finally there is acting with purposeful or
knowing intent to cause grievous bodily injury or death outside
the field of play or interrupting play. In cases such as these a
mens rea, i.e. an intent to cause grievous bodily harm or death
can be made out on the facts, and is clearly distinguishable from
aggressive competition, and that being the case there is really no
good reason to permit the victimization of athletes merely
because the attack occurs in competitive contact sports.
a. Purposely or Knowing Intending to Cause Grievous
Bodily Injury During Competitive Play
Attacks possibly purposefully or knowingly intending to
cause grievous bodily harm may be best exemplified by the play
of former Oakland Raider safety Jack Tatum. In the folklore of
the National Football League, Tatum is widely regarded as a
fierce competitor and the hardest hitting safety of all time.29 In
one of the most celebrated images from Super Bowl XI in 1977,
Tatum hit Minnesota Vikings' wide receiver Sammy White so
hard that White's helmet came off.30 The most infamous example
of Tatum's hitting ability was his hit on New England Patriots
wide receiver Darryl Stingley as he was leaping for a pass
leaving his body entirely exposed, in a single-minded attempt to
catch an overthrown ball. The ball had already left his fingertips
at the time Tatum slammed into him leading with his helmet.
The hit badly damaged Stingley's spinal cord and left him
paralyzed from the chest down. 31 Although the rules were later
changed, at the time, the hit was legal under NFL rules. 32 There
29 See Wikipedia.org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JackTatum. Tatum is popularly
known as the "Assassin." Id.
30 See id.
31 See id. Tatum claims that he attempted to visit Stingley in the hospital soon after
the hit but was forbidden by Stingley's family. See id. The two have not spoken since that
day. See id.
32 See Eric Dexheimer, He Shoots, He Sues, July 8, 2004, http://www.westword.com/
2004-07-08/news/he-shoots-he-sues/1.
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was no penalty, no fine, no prosecution, criminal or civil, and no
apology from Tatum.33 Instead, Tatum boasted: "I like to believe
that my best hits border on felonious assault."34 Tatum remains
a celebrated and honored athlete. 35 Tatum played college ball at
The Ohio State University where current head coach Jim Tressel,
instituted the "Jack Tatum Hit of the Week Award." 36 In light of
Tatum's self-professed belief that he "like[s] to believe that [his]
best hits bordered on felonious assault," perhaps a better
remembrance of Jack Tatum is to coin hard hitting tackles like
his that purposely or knowingly cause grievous bodily harm
"attackles."37 This new term combines the words attack and
tackle to call attention to hits occurring in the context of
competitive contact sports play which border on felonious
assault, and indeed, may very well cross the line of criminality.
A most recent hit worthy of consideration as an "attackle"
occurred on October 1, 2006 in a National Football League game.
Early in the third quarter, just after a five yard touchdown run
by Dallas' Julius Jones in the Cowboys forty-five to fourteen (45-
14) victory, Tennessee Titan defensive lineman, Albert
Haynesworth kicked off the helmet of Dallas offensive lineman
Andre Gurode and then stomped and scraped his cleats across
Gurode's face and forehead. Gurode required thirty stitches and
missed the next two games. 38 Game officials immediately called a
personal foul for flagrant unnecessary roughness against
Haynesworth. When he saw the penalty flag, Haynesworth took
off his helmet and tossed it, drawing a second personal foul and
ejection-for the unsportsmanlike protest, not for stomping on an
opponent's face. 39
33 See id. Tatum has never apologized for the hit. He has stated, 'I don't think I did
anything wrong that I need to apologize for. It was a clean hit." Wikipedia.org,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JackTatum.
34 Notable-Quotes.com, http://www.notable-quotes.com/t/tatumjack.html.
35 Jack Tatum was a 2005 inductee into the College Hall of Fame and in a 2006
Sports Illustrated poll to name the best defensive back of all time, he garnered eight
percent of the vote. He wrote three best-selling books: They Call Me Assassin (1980), They
Still Call Me Assassin (1989), and Final Confessions of NFL Assassin Jack Tatum (1996).
See Wikipedia.org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JackTatum.
36 Wikipedia.org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JackTatum.
37 Id.
38 See Tom Weir, Titans' Haynesworth Suspended Five Games for Stomping Incident,
Oct. 2, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/titans/2006-10-02-haynesworth-
suspension..x.htm.
39 See id.
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After the game, Haynesworth appeared contrite and
remorseful.40 League officials suspended Haynesworth for five
games for the face stomping incident, the longest by the NFL for
on-field actions. 41  The five game suspension will cost
Haynesworth $190,000 of his $646,251 annual salary in forfeited
salary, and possibly a portion of signing bonuses. 42 Nashville's
Metro Police Department and the Davidson County District
Attorney's office issued a joint statement saying they were "ready
to assist Gurode in criminally prosecuting Haynesworth if
Gurode so chooses," but Gurode did not so choose. 43 Kicking off a
helmet and stomping on the head of another with a cleated foot
goes beyond poor sportsmanship; it is a matter of public interest
and requires public vindication regardless of the personal code or
perhaps personal financial motive of the victim not to press
charges.
The stomping, shown repeatedly in television replays,
brought nearly unanimous condemnation.44 These actions go
beyond unsportsmanlike conduct and cannot possibly be
considered an inherent risk of playing football. There should be
no question that such thuggery masquerading as legitimate
competitive sport should be subject to criminal sanction in law
regardless of whether the attack occurs on or off the field of play.
If competition motivated criminal attacks occurring out of play
are the proper domain of the criminal sanction, then so too must
40 Haynesworth called his actions "disgusting" and said he would accept whatever
penalty the NFL issued. Id. Albert Haynesworth has an extensive history of violence
including a road rage incident (May 2006), kicking a teammate in the chest during
practice (2003), and fighting with two teammates (2002). See Titans Lineman
Haynesworth Cleared of Charges Again, June 15, 2006, http://cbs.sportsline.com
nfl/ story/9508496; see also CBC Sports Online, http://www.cbc.ca/sports/football/story/
2006/10/02/nfl-titans-haynesworth.html.
41 See Haynesworth Suspended for Unprecedented Five Games, Oct. 3, 2006,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfllnews/story?id=2610577. Previously, the longest suspension
for on-field behavior was two games for Green Bay defensive lineman Charles Martin for
throwing Chicago quarterback Jim Mahon to the ground during a game on November 23,
1986. Id.
42 See Weir, supra note 40. The Haynesworth suspension is the first NFL suspension
of a player since Rodney Harrison, then with San Diego, received a one game suspension
for hitting Oakland's Jerry Rice with his helmet. Earlier that season, Denver's Kenoy
Kennedy also received a one game suspension for a helmet-to-helmet hit on Chris
Chambers of Miami. See NFL.com, http://www.nfl.com/teams/story/TEN/9700907.
43 See Weir, supra note 40.
44 See Wikipedia.org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albert_- Haynesworth (quoting NFL
Commissioner Roger Goodell as saying that there was "absolutely no place in the game, or
anywhere else for Haynesworth's behavior.") (internal quotations omitted).
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criminal intent be more readily acceptable conceptually in
competitor motivated attacks occurring out of play.
Demonstrable criminal intent should make criminal attacks
during the field of play out of bounds the same as off-field
attacks.
In ice hockey, players may seek to inflict grievous bodily
harm by "slashing" an opponent with a hockey stick. A good
indication that the slash is deliberate is when the slasher has
both hands on the stick (signifying control and added strength)
and usually attacks an opponent about the head or face or ankle
since most of the rest of the body is padded during play. Slashing
is a penalty called when an offending player swings his hockey
stick at an opposing player, regardless of contact. The penalty
may range from a minor penalty to a match penalty, depending
on the injury to the opposing player. The National Hockey
League provides two modern precedents for successful
application of the criminal sanction for acts disrupting
competitive sporting play or occurring immediately at the
conclusion of legitimate sports play. Vancouver authorities
convicted Boston Bruin player Marty McSorley of assault with a
weapon for slashing Vancouver's Donald Brashear in the head
with his stick on February 21, 2000. 45 New York Islanders ice
hockey player Todd Bertuzzi pleaded guilty to causing bodily
harm and missed twenty games for a blind side punch that left
Colorado forward Steve Moore with broken bones in his neck on
March 8, 2004.46
A most recent example of hockey slashing occurred March
8, 2007 when New York Islander "enforcer" Chris Simon slashed
New York Ranger forward Ryan Hollweg with a vicious two-
handed stick swing to the face. The attack occurred on the three
year anniversary of Bertuzzi's blind side punch of Moore. The
45 The National Hockey League suspended McSorley for the final 23 games of the
2000 season. NHL Commissioner Gary Bettman extended the ban until February 2001
and McSorley never played in the NHL again. At the time of his suspension, McSorley
was the fourth most penalized player in the league with 3,381 penalty minutes. See
Wikipedia.org, http://en. wikipedia.org/wikilMartyMeSorley; Simon suspended for hitting
player with stick, http://sports.espn.go.com/nhllnews/story?id=2792516.
46 Bertuzzi missed the final 13 regular season games and the playoffs in 2004. The
NHL extended the banishment to 17 months and prevented him from playing anywhere
during the yearlong NHL lockout in the 2005-06 season. See Wikipedia.org,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilTodd_ Bertuzzi; Simon suspended for hitting player with
stick, http://sports.espn.go.com/nhllnews/ story?id=2792516.
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attack was retaliation for Hollweg driving Simon into the boards,
a clean and legitimate manuever. Simon got up angrily and met
Simon as they came together again, connecting with a swinging
motion near Hollweg's chin and neck. Hollweg fell to his back
and rolled over to his stomach by the boards. He was motionless
for a few minutes and was bleeding from the chin when he got
up. Despite the horrendous appearance of the attack, Hollweg
only required a few stitches. Simon's act warranted a match
penalty for a deliberate attempt to injure. Match officials ejected
Simon with 6:31 emaining in a tie game. The ensuing power play
resulted in Petr Perucha's decisive goal in the New York Ranger's
win.4 7 The NHL suspended Simon a league record 25 games. 48
However, when Hollweg declined to press charges, Nassau
County, (New York) prosecutors ultimately decided against
criminal prosecution as well.49 In a public statement and apology,
Simon indicated that he had met with the team's medical staff
who examined him as well as studied tape of the incidents, in
particular his face and was told that he suffered a concussion
after being hit into the boards. 50 Simon's possible defense of
provocation, automatism, as well as the lack of serious injury and
his apparent remorse may have played as much a role in non-
prosecution as Hollweg's decision not to press charges.
b. Purposely or Knowingly Aggravating a Pre-existing
Injury
An example exemplifying intentional aggravation of a pre-
existing injury occurred in the 1972 international hockey match
between the Soviet Union and Canada. Canadian star Bobby
Clarke delivered a two handed slash to Valeri Kharlamov's sore
ankle, fracturing the Soviet star's ankle. Kharlamov was never
47 Simon suspended for hitting player with stick, http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/news/
story?id=2792516. Simon has been suspended four other times for violent on-ice acts and
received a three-game ban in 1997 after directing a racial slur toward player Mike Grier,
who is black. Id.
48 Kevin Allen, Isle's Simon suspended for rest of season, USA TODAY, Mar. 10, 2007,
http://asp.usatoday.com/community/tags/topic.aspx?req=tag&tag=Ryan%20Hollweg.
49 See Rangers' Hollweg won't press charges vs. Simon, USA TODAY, March 15, 2007;
No charges will be filed in Simon stick-swinging incident, USA TODAY, Mar. 18, 2007,
http://asp.usatoday.comlcommunity/tags/topic.aspx?req=tag&tag=Ryan%20Hollweg.
50 Simon's Statement, Mar. 11, 2007, http://www.islanderarmy.com/blog/category/
chris-simon/.
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able to return to form during the series.51 Prior to the match
there was substantial media coverage given Kharlamov's sore
ankle. Therefore Clarke knew full well that a two handed slash
to Kharlamov's ankle would cause debilitation. After the series,
Kharlamov reflected thusly:
I am convinced that Bobby Clarke was given the job of
taking me out of the game. Sometimes I thought it was his
only goal. I looked into his angry eyes, I saw his stick which
he wielded like a sword, and didn't understand what he was
doing. I had nothing to do with hockey.52
After the attack, the Canadians rallied for a series victory.
Many in the Canadian press lauded the act of violence as "an act
of heroism," but "[tihe attack also cemented Canadian hockey
players' reputation as thugs who won games through
intimidation and violence rather than skill and finesse."53
Specifically attacking a pre-existing injury to debilitate is not
sport and is more properly considered criminally.
iii. Play Disruptive Fights
In addition to acts intended to cause grievous bodily harm
or death, the third area that readily suggests the need for
criminal sanctions is play interrupting brawls or post game
melees. On Saturday, October 15, 2006, established college
football power, the University of Miami Hurricanes, played little
known cross town rivals, the Florida International University
Golden Panthers. Miami's James Bryant caught a five-yard
touchdown pass with about nine minutes left in the third quarter
to give the Hurricanes a thirteen to zero (13-0) lead.54 He pointed
at the FIU bench and bowed to the crowd, incurring a fifteen-
yard penalty for taunting. On the extra point that made it
fourteen to zero (14-0), FIU's Chris Smith knocked down holder
Matt Perelli and appeared to punch him.55 More than 100
51 See CBC Sports Online, http://www.cbc.ca/sports/columns/toplO/ hockey-
lowlights.html#4 (listing series of violent acts in hockey games).
52 1972 Summit Series: A September to Remember, http://www.1972summitseries.com
/kharlamov.html.
53 See id.
54 See Wikipedia.org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikiMiami-FIU-brawl.
55 See id.
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players from both teams joined the fracas that immediately
ensued.56 Video replay shows Miami safety Anthony Reddick
raced off the side lines with his helmet held high and swinging it
like a weapon against the back of an FIU player. 57 Numerous
Miami players are seen stomping on FIU players while they were
on the ground. The video also shows an injured FIU player on
crutches hobbling off the opposing side line and swinging his
crutch like a weapon. 58 Miami police were required to restore
order, but there were no arrests and none are intended.59 The
Miami-FIU brawl was the second of that day as earlier, an on-
field fight between football teams representing Dartmouth and
Holy Cross fought after Holy Cross players celebrated an
overtime victory by stomping of the Dartmouth "D" logo
conveniently set at midfield.60
The culture of American football is such that not only are
arrests not made for such on-field melees, there is a strong
undercurrent of support for such passion, even if deplored
officially or publically. Lamar Thomas, an announcer with
Comcast Sports SouthEast, watched as the Miami-FIU brawl
raged out of control and stated on the air:
Now, that's what I'm talking about ... You come into our
house, you should get your behind kicked. You don't come
into the OB [Orange Bowl] playing that stuff... You can't
come over to our place talking noise like that. You'll get
56 See Erik Brady and Dick Patrick, With Brawl in National Headlines, Miami's
Reputation Takes Step Backward, USA TODAY, Oct. 17, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com
sports/college/footballacc/2006-10-16-miami-coverx.htm (stating that it was most
watched video on youtube.com that Monday).
57 See id. (stating that University of Miami and Athletic Conference Commissioners
suspended him indefinitely and stated that additional disciplinary measures will be taken
to include community service and other action).
58 See id. (quoting that "Florida International dismissed Chris Smith and Marshall
McDuffie Jr. from the team and suspended 16 others indefinitely" and that the University
also required "[a]ll 18 [players] to complete 10 hours of anger management counseling and
fulfill 50 hours of community service intended to educate South Florida youth on
appropriate behavior at athletic competitions.") (internal quotations omitted).
59 See id. (quoting Miami police lieutenant Bill Schwartz as saying that "while some
arrests were made in the stands, the department was not contemplating charges against
players.").
60 See Austin Murphy, In the Bag: OSU's Smith May Have Already Locked Up the
Heisman, SI.COM, Oct. 19, 2006, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/ 2006/writers/
austin murphy/1O/19/murphys.law/index.html (describing other fight that day between
Holy Cross and Dartmouth football teams).
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your butt beat. I was about to go down the elevator to get
in that thing. 61
As the fight slowed, Thomas' comments continued, "I say, why
don't they just meet outside in the tunnel after the ball game and
get it on some more? You don't come into the OB, baby."62
Lamar Thomas, a former wide receiver for the University of
Miami, and now alas, also a former announcer for Comcast
Sports, dismissed him for his comments and also deleted from
their video records of the brawl.63
C. The Propriety of Applying Criminal Law to Regulate Play in
Competitive Contact Sports
In a competitive contact sport, athletes occasionally fall to
purposefully or knowingly causing injury rather than superior
play. But why such reticence in bringing the criminal law into
play to sanction thuggish conduct causing grievous bodily harm?
There is clarity in applying the criminal law to deliberate
injurious conduct between athletes off the field of play. But there
is no clarity in applying criminal law to deliberate, injurious
misconduct between athletes on the field of play. There are
several reasons for the lack of clarity in evaluating criminal
misconduct in on-field play. Chief among these reasons is that
the promotion of legitimate, vigorous competitive contact sport is
an exceedingly worthy goal in a free society. 64 A second is the
conviction borne of historical origins that competitive contact
sports are vicious by nature, and violence, if anything enhances
61 ESPN.com, Canes Analyst Thomas Fired For Comments During Brawl, Oct. 16,
2006, http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/print?id=2628184&type=story.
62 Id.
63 See Erik Brady and Dick Patrick, With Brawl In National Headlines, Miami's
Reputation Takes Step Backward, USA TODAY, Oct. 17, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/
sports/college/footballlacc/2006-10-16-miami-coverx.htm. The University of Miami has
won five national championships since 1983 and has history of fighting during games.
They engaged in post game fight after losing forty to three (40-3) to Louisiana State
University in December 2005, and almost fought on September 16, 2006 with University
of Louisville after stomping on the Louisville logo at midfield. The 1990s Hurricanes'
rivalry with the University of Notre Dame was lampooned as "Catholics vs. Convicts."
Before the 1987 Fiesta Bowl for the National Championship, Penn State players wore
coats and ties while Miami players wore fatigues. See id.
64 See BrainyQuote.com, Vince Lombardi Quotes, http://www.brainyquote.com
quotes/authors/v/vincelombardi.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2007) (quoting Vince
Lombardi as saying "[w]inning is not everything; it is the only thing.").
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its entertainment value.65 And, third, it may be argued that self-
policing through creating and enforcing the rules of the game
adequately safeguard players from deliberate, injurious
conduct.66
i. Sporting Violence as Low Entertainment and the Increasing
Concern for Player Safety
In American Football, the "big hit" is entertainment. It
plays to base instincts. During the 2006 NFL Season, a regular
piece on an ESPN Toyota Half Time show featured re-plays of
exceptionally violent hits. At each resounding hit, the
announcers colorfully exclaimed: "He got jacked up!"6 7 So too
WWIX TV, the National Broadcast Company affiliate in
Cincinnati, features a Carstar Collision of the week which
routines features especially violent on-field hits.68 One example
of "big hit" entertainment following an interception is when
Green Bay Packers offensive lineman Chad Clifton lightly ran
twenty-five yards behind the play. Out of nowhere, Tampa Bay
Buccaneers defensive lineman Warren Sapp viciously leveled
Clifton, knocking him out for the rest of the season. 69 Clifton had
no chance of factoring into the play and did not see Sapp prior to
the hit. While the hit was legal under NFL rules, it was clear
that Sapp intended to hit Clifton as hard as he could and possibly
to injure as well.70 Sapp knew that this hit would have nothing
65 See Sally Otos, Cohen v. Brown University: Sports in the Legal Arena, 3 SPORTS
LAW. J. 141, 162 (1996) (stating that athletes are taught to use their bodies as machines
and weapons with which to annihilate opponents).
66 See NFL.com, Digest of Rules-Protection of Passer, http://www.nfl.com/fans/rulesl
protectionofpasser (last visited Feb. 18, 2007) (providing one prominent example of such
rules include those concerning protection of the passer. Rule five in this category
specifically states: "[olfficials are to blow the play dead as soon as the quarterback is
clearly in the grasp and control of any tackler, and his safety is in jeopardy.").
67 Michael David Smith, ESPN Unveils Kinder, Gentler "Jacked Up!" Segment, Sept.
11, 2006, http://nfl.aolsportsblog.com/2006/09/11/espn-unveils-kinder-gentler-jacked-up-
segment/.
68 See Mike Breen, Sunday Night Quarterbacks, http://www.best-of-
cincinnati.com/feature-jocks.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2007) (asserting Carstar Quality
Collision Service sponsors "Collision of the Week" highlight).
69 See ProFootballWeekly.com, With Whom Do You Side In the Warren Sapp-Mike
Sherman flap, Nov. 30, 2002, http://www.profootballweekly.comIPFW/Features/
NFL+Features/2002/Questionll3002.htm (describing play as "an innocent-looking play
turned vicious.").
70 See William C. Rhoden, Sports of the Times; Violent Sport Must Control the
Violence, NY TIMES, Nov. 30, 2002, at D1 (offering that in such situations, difference
between a devastating hit and pulling back is professional respect).
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to do with the outcome of the play. Possibly its only purpose was
to injure Clifton and knock him out of the game. While he was
acting within the rules of the game, Sapp arguably demonstrated
sufficient mens rea in causing an injury and that is certainly an
appropriate basis to assess criminal liability.
Examples of criminally unsportsmanlike violence abound
in college as well. In 2006, an Iowa defensive lineman punched
an opposing player in the face after tearing off his helmet in the
course of a play. 71 There are many examples of arguably cheap
shots such as this in football, so many that they do not gain much
attention from the media.72 Late hits and helmet-to-helmet hits
are especially indicative of intent to cause grievous bodily injury
and should be subject to the criminal sanction in extreme cases.
There are limiting aspects to the "big hit" form of
entertainment in that highly regarded players who are
frequently featured to ensure competitive success and to delight
fans are also the same players most likely to succumb to the
debilitating injury. The knee injuries suffered by Palmer and to
a lesser extent, Rothlisberger in 2005, begat a new NFL rule
which bars a defensive player from hitting a quarterback at or
below the knees when the quarterback has one or both feet on
the ground. 73 Concerns for maintaining a viable entertainment
product motivated this change as much as player safety. Atlanta
Falcons General Manager, and NFL Competition Committee Co-
Chairman Rich McKay, explained that the quarterback position
is a defenseless position when his feet are on the ground and he's
throwing the football. Thus, he stated "[w]e have to find ways to
protect him .... We know how important [the quarterback] is to
the franchises and the stability of the franchise," and what
quarterback injuries have done to certain teams over the years.74
71 Tim May, Penton Likely To Play More Against Spartans, Oct. 11, 2006,
http://www.buckeyextra.coml?story=dispatcl2006/10/11/20061011-C3-02.html.
72 See Thewizardofodds.com, Cheapest Shots of the Year, http://thewizardofodds.
blogspot.com/2006/12/cheapest-shots-of-year.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2007) (positing list
of more cheap shots in college football during 2006 season).
73 See NFL.com, Digest of Rules-Protection of Passer, http://www.nfl.com/fans/rulesl
protectionofpasser (last visited Feb. 18, 2007) (quoting "[n]o defensive player who has an
unrestricted path to the quarterback may hit him flagrantly in the area of the knee(s) or
below when approaching in any direction.").
74 Vito Stellino, NFL Rule Changes Possible, TIMES UNION, Mar. 23, 2006, available
at http://www.jacksonville.com/tu-online/stories/032306/jag-21428643.shtml (stating how
important it is to protect safety of NFL players).
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At the conclusion of every American football season, the
NFL's Competition Committee evaluates the game and suggests
rule changes to improve the competitive nature of the game, its
entertainment value, and to improve upon player safety.75 In
2006, the NFL Competition Committee cited player safety as the
reason for five rule changes. 76 The rule changes were as follows:
* If possible, rushing defenders must make a
conscious effort to avoid low hits on the
quarterback. Previously, defenders were not
required to make a conscious effort to avoid low
hits if momentum was a factor. Penalty:
Roughing the passer, loss of 15 yards.
* The prohibition against blocking in the back
above the waist applies to a player on the kicking
team while the ball is in flight during a
scrimmage kick. Previously, this was not a foul.
Penalty: Blocking in the back, loss of 10 yards.
" All players are prohibited from grabbing the
inside collar of the back of the shoulder pads or
jersey, or the inside collar of the side of the
shoulder pads or jersey, and immediately pull ing
down the runner. This does not apply to a runner
who is in the tackle box or to a quarterback who
is in the pocket. Previously, the "horse-collar"
tackle rule did not include the back of the
shoulder pads or jersey. This increases the scope
of the rule. Penalty: Unneccessary roughness,
loss of 15 yards.
" During a field goal attempt or a PAT [point after
attempt], any defensive player within one yard of
the line of scrimmage at the snap must have his
helmet outside the snapper's shoulder pad. This
will provide protection to the snapper, who is in a
defenseless position. Penalty: Illegal formation,
loss of five yards.
75 See Scout.com, NFL Rule changes for 2006, http://nflexperts.scout.com/2/
556118.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2007) (stating that NFL Competition Committee spends
each off season evaluating and suggesting new rules).
76 See id.
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No more than six players may line up on the
same side of a formation on a kickoff. Previously,
teams could "load up" one side with more players
for onside kicks. Penalty: Illegal formation, loss
of ten yards and re-kick at the option of the
receiving team. 77
Player safety is an increasing concern in the NFL.78 Similarly,
college football enacted new rules against 'spearing" (hitting with
the helmet) to protect players and to reduce injuries. 79
ii. Are the Rules of the Game Adequate Safeguards of Player
Safety?
National Football League play is perhaps as violent as
any modern popular sport. NFL coaches and officials have
become increasingly concerned to promote player safety by
penalizing teams whose players engage in injury prone
violence.80 The problem remains however that the rules and
practices of the game are set at the highest level of competition
where highly skilled athletes are experienced and well trained to
play in very hazardous activity and are extremely well
compensated to accept the risks inherent in such hazardous
activity.8 1 These same rules and practices apply at every level of
competition with only slight modification to accommodate lesser
size and ability. This is not to say that the criminal law should
be any less concerned to protect highly trained, top professional
athletes who are paid extravagant sums to play. It is merely a
necessary observation that the rules and practices established for
77 Id.
78 See NFL.com, Vic Carucci, Owners Have Full Agenda at Meetings, Mar. 25, 2006,
http://www.nfl.com/news/story/9337001 (quoting that "[p]layer safety is the emphasis of
several proposals that the league's competition committee has submitted for voting by the
owners.").
79 See MSNBC.com, Safety First: NCAA Changes Spearing Rule,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id19088803/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2007) (stating that changing
this rule should lead to safer games).
80 See NFL.com, Digest of Rules-Summary of Penalties, http://www.nfl.com/fans/
rules/penaltysummaries (last visited Feb. 18, 2007) (listing nineteen safety oriented rules,
infractions of which are penalized by moving ball 15 yards against offending team).
81 See Daniel Gross, The N.F.L.'s Blue-Collar Workers, NY TIMES, Jan. 21, 2007, at 5
(stating average NFL player's salary is $1.3 million); see also Paul Zimmerman,
Unnecessary Roughness, Nov. 16, 2006, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2006/writers/
dr_z/1 1/16/correctness/ (noting quarterback injuries attract most attention but other
players are "getting massacred, legally clipped, cut off at the legs by one or more blockers,
crippled from behind").
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top level play of activity, sporting, or otherwise, sets the
paradigm for the lower levels of play and for all manner and
quality of competitors.8 2 The appropriateness of applying the
criminal sanction to curb criminal aggression in competitive
contact sports becomes more palatable the more we acknowledge
the high financial incentive to win in professional sports. The
prevalence of criminal thuggery masquerading as legitimate
sport skews the validity of implied consent as a defense to
"attackles." And, the validity of implied consent becomes
considerably less palatable at lower levels of play where financial
compensation for known risk taking is entirely lacking and the
vulnerability to criminal thuggery masquerading as legitimate
sport is unacceptably high.83
Game penalties and league fines address naturally
occurring misadventure owing to the culture of violence, speed,
and competitive nature of football. Their goal is to enhance the
competitive environment. They are ill conceived and too
erratically applied to ensure against purposeful or knowing
misconduct.S4 Criminal misconduct is beyond the scope of the
rules.
82 See Joey Johnston, They Said It, TAMPA TRIB., Jan. 6, 2002, at 6 (quoting Steve
Spurrier in 1996 accusing Florida State University players of intentional late hits on
quarterback Danny Wuerffel); see also Run-Oriented Rivals Ready to Knock Helmets
Again, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept. 1, 2006, at 5 (billing an East Bay High School
football game as a good one to attend if you like to watch kids run around hitting each
other).
83 See Bill Finley, A Single Goal in Common, NY TIMES, Dec. 17, 2006, at 3 (finding
that overambitious coaches and parents have forgotten that youth sports are suppose to
be about fun); see also LOCAL6.COM, Youth Football Coach Accused of Having "Hit List",
Oct. 10, 2005, http://www.local6.com/news/5072386/detail.html (providing City of
Leesburg, Virginia cancelled youth football last year when accusations surfaced that
Youth Football Coach created hit list that may have led to an eleven-year-old boy having
his wrist shattered when he was intentionally tripped by another boy after scoring
touchdown).
84 On NFL Sunday, October 8, 2006, Kansas City Chiefs' running back Larry Johnson
caught a short pass and turned it into a seventy-eight-yard gain to the Arizona Nine with
two to thirty-one (2:31) left in the game. Johnson would have scored if Arizona Cardinal
cornerback Antrel Rolle had not grabbed him by the facemask and twist his head
backward. Rolle did not even let go of the facemask as the two players tumbled out of
bounds. The Cardinals lost the game twenty-three to twenty (23-20). The league fined
Rolle $12,500. It is his second fine for an excessive hit. See Nancy Gray, At Long Last, the
Sun Comes Out, and Alex Smith can Smile Again, SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Oct. 15, 2006,
at C9. The very next week on October 15, 2006, the Pittsburgh Steelers beat the Kansas
City Chiefs forty-five to seven (45-7). In that game, Johnson ran down safety Troy
Polamalu on an interception and tackling him by his long hair streaming out the back of
Palamalu's helmet. Game officials penalized Johnson not for his hair-only-tackle (which is
not an infraction of the rules), but for yanking Polamalu down out of bounds to touch off a
brief skirmish. Johnson said: "I made the tackle, tried to get up and my hand was full of
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The rules and practices of the game can not be completely
relied upon to ensure a safe playing environment because
administrators, coaches, and referees who establish the rules and
practices of the game are primarily concerned with and defined
by the sport. Criminal law as a vehicle to inculcate values and
behavioral modification, reflects a broader public interest than
any sport, and by way of contrast, a government, which is
representative of the body politic at large, is positioned to take a
larger, societal view than any group of sports administrators,
coaches, and referees. The broader interest is especially
important to set standards of safety at the highest levels as well
as the lowest levels of competition. The line between criminal
contact and legitimate sports contact must necessarily be drawn
by the body politic from which citizens of sport emerge and to
which they repair.
iii. When Might Vigorous Competition Become Illegitimate?
There can be no fear that a limited and precise
introduction of the criminal sanction to on-field play in
competitive contact sports goes too far. As with landmark
interest in curbing domestic violence, a culture of sports violence
should not go unnoticed by the criminal law. To say that
criminal behavior occurring in competitive contact sports is
beyond the reach of criminal law is to say to little by way of
deterrence in criminal law and too much for competitive contact
sports by way of integrating criminal harms from illegitimate
play into the context of the game. The conceptual barrier to
criminal sports batteries should fall for the same reason that
barriers to criminalizing domestic batteries fell, and that is an
excess of criminal like injuries occurring in competitive contact
sports. Implied consent may be overextended given the level of
malevolence that sometime occurs in American football. The law
his hair. I hope I got penalized for hitting Ike Taylor in the face twice and not for pulling
Troy's hair." See Tony Grossi, Tressel in a Brown Sweater Vest?, PLAIN DEALER REP., Oct.
22, 2006, at Cll. NFL Director of Officiating Mike Pereira has ruled that pulling hair was
like pulling a shirt. See John McClain, Week 7; Pro Football; Vikings Twice as Nice in
ice's Second Season, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 19, 2003, at 4. The difference is that unlike
pulling a shirt, a vicious jerk of the head by grabbing long hair is just as likely to cause a
neck injury as grabbing a facemask. NFL rules permit the former, but penalize the latter.
See John McClain, Week 7; Pro Football; Vikings Twice as Nice in Tice's Second Season,
HOUSTON CHRON., Oct. 19, 2003 at 4.
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of rape and sexual assault protects sex professionals even though
their consensual activity places them at certain risk of criminal
violence. Likewise, the law of homicides and aggravated battery
should protect athletes even though athletes engage in
competitive contact sport which places them at certain risk to
violence, even criminal violence. No player assumes the risk of,
or consents to, criminal conduct simply by engaging in an activity
where serious bodily injury or death is higher than other
professional and recreational activities. No sport or business
should immunize criminal thuggery from prosecution because to
do so violates public interest.
iv. Too Much Litigation?
America is a litigious society and there is a fear that given
the choice between legal and non-legal remedies, disputants
might all too quickly opt for the legal remedy. The legal process
is intrusive on all parties, cumbersome, expensive, unwieldy, and
too cost prohibitive for all but the most compelling cases.8 5 At the
early stages, an over reliance on legal solutions is not necessarily
a bad thing as the formality of law and the expertise of lawyers
provides for the most compelling way to change behavioral
modification and has the widest effect in educating the general
population as well as inculcating new values into a sports
culture.8 6 The right mix of criminal and administrative sanctions
will be found fairly quickly.
D. The Goal of a Creating a Sports Battery
In determining the point at which a controlled, intentional
attack on a fellow competitor crosses the line to criminal
misconduct, it is argued here that a controlled, intentional attack
85 See Kenneth Einar Himma, Technology, Values, and the Justice System: Towards A
Theory of Legitimate Access: Morally Legitimate Authority and the Right of Citizens to
Access the Civil Justice System, 79 WASH. L. REV. 31, 49 (2004) (noting that significant
number of Americans living below the poverty level are not being provided for by the civil
justice system); see also Peter J. Riga, Spirituality of Lawyering, 40 CATH. LAW. 295, 300
(2001) (stating few can afford the high prices of lawsuits).
86 See Matthew Gilligan, Stalking the Stalker: Developing New Laws to Thwart Those
who Terrorize Others, 27 GA. L. REV. 285, 300-01 (1992) (stating criminal sanctions
educate the public about the crime, deter crime and punish those who are undeterred); see
also Morell E. Mullins, Sr., Coming to Terms with Strict and Liberal Construction, 64
ALB. L. REV. 9, 78 (2000) (explaining purpose of criminal law is to deter criminal
behavior).
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designed to cause grievous bodily harm should be recognized in
law even if masquerading as a legitimate sporting objective.
Whether a controlled, intentional attack on a fellow competitor
crosses the line to criminal misconduct should depend as much
on the nature of the injury suffered as on how the injury is
inflicted. The primary basis for criminal liability in competitive
sports should be purposeful or knowingly causing serious bodily
injury or death. The primary bar to criminal liability is implied
consent or assumption of risk.87 Thus there are really two
questions we seek to answer. First, given that exerting brute
force is a permissible intent in competitive contact sports, when
is the line crossed to criminal intent. Second, given the doctrines
of implied consent and assumption of risk, what if any risks are
not inherent risks of the game or what if any acts are different in
kind from those for which consent is implied?
From a criminal law perspective, the starting point for
competitive contact sport, the same for any other socially
approved activity is to promote an expectation that participants
walk off the field of play substantially physically intact the same
as when they walked on to the field. It is easy to recognize that
an athlete assumes the risk of injury due to self-inflicted physical
strain from extreme physical exertion, as well as the risk of
injury from the clash of physical exertion from others that is
inherent in legitimate competitive play. It is not so easy to
recognize exactly what risks are inherent in the game and to
what extent an athlete can be assumed to grasp risks that go
beyond rules, which are themselves applied subject to wide
discretion exercised by game officials, to include something as
nebulas as the practices of the game. Sports injuries can be, and
often are, serious, but at the end of the day, athletes generally
expect to walk away from the field of sport suffering no more
than minor bumps and bruises resulting from legitimate athletic
play, and not criminal attempts to render an opponent athlete
87 See Charles Harary, Aggressive Play or Criminal Assault? An in Depth Look at
Sports Violence and Criminal Liability, 25 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 197, 205 (2002) (asserting
"participation in a sport provides automatic consent to certain contact encountered during
the usual course of competitive athletic events even if this contact can, or does, produce
serious injury."); see also Jeff Yates & William Gillespie, The Problem of Sports Violence
and the Criminal Prosecution Solution, 12 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 145, 160 (2002)
(finding that if prosecutions for sports battery are to succeed the courts must take into
account the implied consent defense to violence occurring during contact sports).
[Vol. 22:1
LEX SPORTIVA
less capable. Even where major injuries inevitably occur due to
excessive risk taking during play, no athlete should have to also
suffer thuggish attacks masquerading as legitimate play. It
must be the goal of criminal law to promote basic human safety
even where consensual activity places participants at a certain
risk level for some injuries.
It seems quite impossible to derive a criminal law
applicable to competitive sports by the simple expedient of
piercing the unjustified bubble of de facto immunity that exempts
the athletic world from criminal liability except for the most
egregious cases. Instead, it seems only sensible to start anew
with a new offense that clearly places competitive sports
participants on notice.
Any definition of criminal sports battery that did not rely
on objective, clearly defined rules and objectives consistent with
the rules and practices of a particular sport would almost
certainly run afoul of constitutional limits in defining crime.
Athlete and coach must know at the outset what the prohibited
conduct is and how to avoid the prohibited conduct. The
Emperor Nero's infamous contribution to legal inanity was in
posting the law of the land too high for the common man not on
horseback to be able to read.88 We must posit clear objective
standards to avoid the same due process fiasco.
It is also important from the standpoint of judicial
economy that the standard for evaluating the possible occurrence
of a criminal sports battery must be easily understood and
efficiently applied standard. What it lacks in judicial insight, can
more than be made up for in judicial economy. Multi-factored
tests are theoretical; bright line rules are more practical. A
newly proposed rule must be manageable to be useful.
88 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules., 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1179 (1989) (discussing Nero's habit of posting laws high on pillars so that they would be
harder to read and easier to break); see also Rickie Sonpal, Old Dictionaries and New
Textualists, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2177, 2195 (2003) (explaining Nero's practice of posting
edicts high on pillars).
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E. Review of American Statutes89
Several states have passed special interest tort legislation
directed at protecting major tourist recreational sports
attractions. Montana passed legislation setting up a liability
regime for snowmobiles. 90 Montana specifically states that "[a]
snowmobiler shall accept legal responsibility for injury or
damage of any kind to the extent that the injury or damage
results from risks inherent in the sport of snowmobiling."91 The
Montana statute also specifies the risks inherent in the sport. 92
Similarly, New York 93 and Vermont 94 each have a statute which
specifically assigns duties and liabilities for ski area operators
and skiers.95 Interestingly, the State of Ohio has passed
comprehensive statutes involving roller skating96 and equine
activities, 97  which explicitly assign risks inherent in the
respective activities. 98  Utah passed a statute specifying
assumption of risk at shooting ranges. 99 The Utah statute is
fairly typical of such special interest legislation. The statute
reads:
Each person who participates in shooting at a shooting
range accepts the associated risks to the extent the
risks are obvious and inherent. Those risks include
injuries that may result from noise, discharge of
projectile or shot, malfunction of shooting equipment
not owned by the shooting range, natural variations in
terrain, surface or subsurface snow or ice conditions,
89 See Appendix A for a compilation of American statutes codifying common law
assault and battery or otherwise addressing sport related issues such as premise liability,
assaults on sports officials, or special interest legislation for select sports.
90 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 23-2-654 (2005) (detailing snowmobiler's assumption of
responsibility and duties).
91 Id.
92 Id.
93 See NY CLS GEN. OBLIG. § 18-103 (2007) (stating duties of ski area operators); see
also NY CLS GEN. OBLIG. § 18-105 (2007) (stating duties of skiers).
94 See 12 V.S.A. § 1038 (2007) (stating skier's duties).
95 See CLS GEN. OBLIG. § 18-103 (2007) (stating duties of ski area operators); NY CLS
GEN. OBLIG. § 18-105 (2007) (stating duties of skiers); 12 V.S.A. § 1038 (2007) (stating
skier's duties).
96 See OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 4171.01 (2006).
97 See OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2305.321 (2006).
98 See OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 4171.01 (2006); OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2305.321
(2006).
99 See UTAH CODE ANN. § 47-3-2 (2006).
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bare spots, rocks, trees, and other forms of natural
growth or debris.100
Finally, West Virginia passed special interest legislation
protecting owners of whitewater rafting facilities by recognizing
inherent risks and assigning same to participants.101 Likewise,
forty-five states have passed special interest legislation setting
out duties and liabilities of owners and managers of sports
facilities and premises.102
There is a real dearth of criminal statutes addressing
competitive contact sporting activities. A minority of states have
passed statutes imposing criminal misdemeanor or lesser felony
level penalties for limited focus statutes. 103 Florida has a statute
prohibiting amateur mixed martial arts and all martial matches
must be sanctioned by an organization, which is approved by a
state commission.104 Likewise, all professional matches must
comply with rules adopted by a State Commission.105 Georgia
has codified safety rules and regulations governing professional
boxing primarily to provide medical safeguards.106 Louisiana
passed a criminal prohibition of tough man competitions.107
There is also a small minority of states, Alabama,108 Florida,109
Louisiana,110 and Massachusetts,I"' with criminal statutes
specifically protecting sports officials from abuse by fans.112
100 Id.
101 See W. VA CODE § 20-3B-1 (2007).
102 See statutory compilation at Appendix A.
103 See Yates & Gillespie, supra note 81 at 214 (stating that one reason violence
remains a part of sports that the leagues rather than the states have assumed the role of
regulating violent conduct).
104 See FLA. STAT §548.008 (2006).
105 See FLA. STAT §548.008 (2006).
106 See GA. CODE ANN. § 43-4B-7 (2006). The statute provides rules and regulations
for professional boxing within Georgia. See id.
107 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:102.11 (2006). The statute imposes criminal liability
on individuals involved in illegal contact sports. See id.
108 See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-144 (2006). The statute seeks to protect sport officials by
holding harassing fans criminally liable. See id.
109 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 784.081 (2006). The statute holds individuals liable for
assault and battery of sports officials. See id.
110 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:34.4 (2006). The statute holds individuals liable for
the battery of school sporting officials. See id.
111 See MASS. ANN. LAwS ch. 272 § 36A (2006). The statute imposes a criminal fine on
individuals making obscene or slanderous statements to sports officials. See id.
112 See e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:34.4 (2006); ALA. CODE § 13A-11-144 (2006); FL.
STAT. ANN. § 784.081 (2006) (imposing criminal liability on individuals committing
battery, assault, or harassment against sports officials).
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Californial 3 and Marylandl1 4 have criminal statutes that
address fan behavior at sporting events more broadly than just
abuse of officials. 115
Likewise a review of existing scholarship finds a fair
number of articles addressing tortious liability. In a piece
published in the Northwestern University Law Review, Professor
Fitzgerald analyzes the application of the torts doctrine of
inherent risk to coaching negligence."i 6 Professor Fitzgerald
concludes that modified comparative negligence comports with
the well-established goal of loss avoidance, while at the same
time preserving the vigorous nature of athletic competition. 17
Coaches maintain discretion under a modified negligence
approach, and, as explained by Professor Fitzgerald, liability
attaches only if the coach is more than fifty percent responsible
for injury to an athlete under his care.118 A second article more
closely on topic by Professor Yasser also applies inherent risk
doctrine and concludes that comparative negligence optimizes
safe behavior without detracting from vigorous competition.11 9
I. RELEVANCE OF THE RULES OF THE GAME
Obeying the rules is an integral part of playing any sport.
Only when all participants agree to be bound by the constitutive
rules of the game can a contest take place. Without agreed upon
rules, there can be no game and similarly, playing outside the
rules cannot be considered playing the game at all. The first
113 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.83 (2006). The statute outlines unlawful actions for
attendees of professional sporting events such as throwing objects. See id.
114 See MD. CODE ANN., CRIMINAL LAW § 10-203 (2006). The statute prohibits
interference by attendees of professional sporting events. See id.
115 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 243.83 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-203 (2006)
(prohibiting fan interference at sporting events).
116 See Timothy B. Fitzgerald, The "Inherent Risk" Doctrine, Amateur Coaching
Negligence, and the Goal of Loss Avoidance, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 889 (2005). The article
examines the increasing problem of sports related injuries in a legal context. See id.
117 See Fitzgerald, supra note 110, at 925 (noting that while athletes participate with
knowledge of risk of injury, coaches may be comparatively negligent for failing to inform
or provide safe environments).
118 See Fitzgerald, supra note 110, at 927 (stating that under Illinois' comparative
negligence statute, coaches would not be apportioned fault unless he or she were more
than fifty percent liable).
119 See Ray Yasser, In the Heat of the Competition: Tort Liability of One Participant to
Another; Why Can't Participants Be Required to be Reasonable?, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L.
253, 270 (1995) (finding that "[u]nder comparative negligence statutes, a contributorily
negligent plaintiff is not necessarily precluded from recovery.").
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problem is that a uniform system of rules and a penalty scheme
for their infraction is inadequate to address intentional rule
violations, which purposely or knowingly cause serious injury.
Sport generally presumes out of self-preservation that true
sportsmen players will not purposely or knowingly intend to kill
or cause grievous bodily injury to each other. Thus, rules
proscribing such actions are never thought to be necessary. The
second problem is that the rules are only reactively designed and
enforced to ensure a safe environment for play. Adjustments are
made only after the incidence of grievous bodily injury clearly
becomes profound, and even then usually in the off season. 120
The third problem is that concrete rules, no matter how
comprehensive, cannot completely describe the permissible
universe of acceptable play and risks involved in the game. What
must be added to the mix is sports practices. Competitive contact
sports are played not just according to the written rules, but also
to a practice of the sport, which regardless of experience and
familiarity with the game, cannot be sufficiently described to
clarify the true risks involved in the game.
A. The English Rule
The English Rule allows that regardless as to whether the
injury causing act occurred on the field of play or elsewhere, the
injury-causing challenge may be judged criminal if the requisite
mens rea is present; however, play within the rules supports a
rebuttable presumption that the actor did not injure with malice
or intentionally or knowingly engage in activity likely to result in
death or injury.121 This rule is found in Regina v. Bradshaw,12 2
a case decided in 1878 involving a soccer match in which the
defendant charged the deceased after the ball had been played,
catching him hard in his stomach with his knees and rupturing
his intestines. The deceased died the next day from a rupture of
120 See Wikipedia.org, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JackTatum (noting that Jack
Tatum's hit on Daryl Stingly in which he lead with his helmet, or spearing, became
barred by NFL rules only after Stingley's injury).
121 See Regina v. Bradshaw, 14 Cox C.C. 83 (Leicester Spring Assizes 1878).
122 Id.
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the intestines. 123 Lord Justice Bramwell in summing up the case
to the jury said:
The question for you to decide is whether the death of
the deceased was caused by the unlawful act of the
prisoner. There is no doubt that the prisoner's act
caused the death and the question is whether the act
was unlawful. No rules or practice of any game
whatever can make that lawful which is unlawful by
the law of the land; and the law says that you shall not
do that which is likely to cause the death of another.
For instance, no persons can by agreement go out and
fight with deadly weapons, doing by agreement what
the law says shall not be done and thus shelter
themselves from the consequences of their acts.
Therefore in one way you need not concern yourselves
with the rules of football [soccer]. But on the other
hand if a man is playing according to the rules and
practice of the game and not going beyond it, it may be
reasonable to infer that he is not actuated by any
malicious motive or intention and that he is not acting
in a manner which he knows will be likely to
productive of death or injury. But independent of the
rules, if the prisoner intended to cause serious hurt to
the deceased or if he knew that, in charging as he did,
he might produce serious injury and was indifferent
and reckless as to whether he would produce serious
injury or not, then the act would be unlawful. In
either case he would be guilty of a criminal act and
you must find him guilty; if you are of the contrary
opinion, you will acquit him. 124
[Lord Justice Bramwell] carefully reviewed the evidence, stating
that no doubt the game was, in any circumstances, a rough one;
but he was unwilling to decry the manly sports of this country,
123 In an American football analogy to Bradshaw's injury, on September 24, 2006 in
Tampa Bay, quarterback Chris Simms played through an entire game after suffering
violent hits to his midsection in a losing effort against the Carolina Panthers. Simm
required emergency surgery to remove a split spleen immediately after the game. Simms
was out for the remainder of the 2006 season and is expected to play in the 2007 season.
See ESPN.com, Bucs Quarterback Simms Land on Season-Ending IR,
http://sports.espn.go.comlnfllnews/story?id=2648788 (last visited Feb. 23, 2007).
124 See Regina, 14 Cox C.C. 83 (Leicester Spring Assizes 1878).
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all of which were no doubt attended with more or less danger. 125
The verdict was not guilty.126
The English Rule presumes that no rules or culture or
practice of any game can make that lawful which is unlawful by
law of the land; and the law says you shall not cause death or
grievous bodily injury of another. 127 Thus, under the English
Rule, the rules of the game are not dispositive for or against
criminal guilt, rather they provide evidentiary significance as to
the mental state of the defendant. Because the verdict of
acquittal in Regina v. Bradshaw was not criticized even in a case
involving a sports death, the presumption of fair play that the
player who injures or causes death on the field of play did not act
with malice or intent to injure or knowingly engage in conduct
likely to cause injury, would be very difficult for the prosecution
to rebut. Rhetorically excessive pre-game bravado would not
likely rebut the presumption of a legitimate sporting objective.
Perhaps, if the death or injury causing act occurred during a
flagrant breach of the rules, the presumption of fair play would
not be triggered automatically.
B. The American Rule
The American Rule holds that if the rules and practices of
the game are reasonable, consented to by all engaged, and are
not likely to induce grievous bodily injury or death, then injuries,
even fatal injuries occurring on the field of play are excused.128
The American Rule is stated in People v. Fitzsimmons.129 That
case involved an exhibition boxing match in which a punch killed
the opponent and led to a charge of homicide.130 In charging the
jury, the Judge stated:
125 See id.
126 See id.
127 See Regina, 14 Cox C.C. 83 (Leicester Spring Assizes 1878).
128 See People v. Fitzsimmons, 34 N.Y.S. 1102, 1106-09 (1895). The court discussed
factors to be considered such as whether the decedent could lawfully consent to
participate in the boxing match and whether the defendant participated with the criminal
intent of inflicting injury. See id.
129 34 N.Y.S. 1102 (1895).
130 See id. at 1102. There were conflicting accounts of the deadly blow as some
witnesses described the hit as a "light tap," while others described the decedent as
slumping to the ground after the hit. See id.
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If the rules of the game and the practices of the game
are reasonable, are consented to by all engaged, are
not likely to induce serious injury, or to end life, if
then, as a result of the game, an accident happens, it
is excusable homicide.131
Finding the punch to have been thrown within the rules of
boxing, and that the rules themselves were reasonable, the jury
returned a verdict of not guilty. 132
In contrast to the strictly mens rea approach under
English law, the American approach focuses on the
reasonableness of the rules of the game and whether the
defendant was playing within rules in pursuit of a legitimate
sport objective. The implication under the American rule is that
doctrines of consent would negate criminal liability provided that
injury occurred within the rules and practices of the game, so
long as the rules and practices themselves are reasonable. Thus
under the American rule, only acts that occur outside the rules
and practices of the game would qualify as candidates for
criminal sanction. Whereas consent can negate criminal liability
under the American rule, under the English law criminal liability
is conclusively established on a finding of mens rea.
C. The Functional Equivalence of the English and American
Rules
In application, the English and the American rules would
not likely yield different results. Since, under English law,
following the rules of sport raises a rebuttable, but fairly high
presumption of fair play, and, results in a functional equivalent
of the American Rule, under which adherence to the rules and
practices of the game where the rules and practices themselves
are reasonable excuses injury or fatal injury provides a safe
harbor even for seriously injurious actions. This observation is
borne out in Regina v. Green,133 as well as the practical
131 People v. Fitzsimmons, 34 N.Y.S. 1102, 1109 (1895).
132 See id. at 1102.
133 [1971] 16 D.L.R.3d 137 (Ont. Prov. Ct. 1970). The case involved two hockey
players who engaged in a fight. See id. Both participants were tried separately. See
Regina v. Maki, [1970] 14 D.L.R. (3d) 164 (Ont. Prov. Ct. 1970).
[Vol. 22:1
LEX SPORTIVA
difficulties of applying these rules to the fast paced activity which
is competitive contact sport.
Regina v. Green involved prosecution for an on-ice fight,
which interrupted a National Hockey League exhibition game
played September 21, 1969 in the City of Ottawa.134 The game
was between the St. Louis Blues and the Boston Bruins. Wayne
Maki played for St. Louis and Ted. Green played for Boston and
the two engaged in a fight, disrupting play.135 The Maki and
Green prosecutions are important for several reasons. First, they
are the first modern criminal prosecutions involving hockey play
in the Western World. 136
Second, although the Courts applied the English rule,
namely that although playing within the rules and practice of the
game was not a defense per se, both Courts, found that the
practices of the game fatally undermined the prosecution's case
to prove assault.137 Applying the English Rule, the Green Court
gave much deference to the culture of the game as defined by its
practices as well as its rules in evaluating the charged
misconduct for criminal liability.13s
We must remember that we are dealing with a hockey
game. We are dealing with two competent hockey
players at the peak of their form. We are not now
dealing with the ordinary facts of life, the ordinary
going and coming. We must remember that when we
discuss the action of these men we are examining it
within that forum and we are discussing it within the
context in which the game is played, at a high speed
and obviously with people keenly on edge. In these
circumstances I find as a fact that Mr. Green's action
that night was instinctive and that all he was doing in
134 See Maki, [1971] 14 D.L.R. (3d) 164; see also Green, [1970] 16 D.L.R. (3d) 137.
These cases are discussed infra in Defenses under the law of self-defense and implied
consent at 44-48.
135 See Green, [19701 16 D.L.R. (3d) 137.
136 See Harary, supra note 81, at 205 (2002) (citing Maki and Green as two of the first
criminally prosecuted cases of sports violence).
137 See Green, [1970] 16 D.L.R. (3d) 137 (suggesting that professional hockey could
not be played with the force and vigor necessary during competition without "a great
number of what would in normal circumstances be called assaults"); see also Maki, [1971]
14 D.L.R. (3d) 164 (observing that athletes, when they step on the playing field, assume
certain hazards and risks involved in playing the sport).
138 See Green, [1970] 16 D.L.R. (3d) 137 (pointing out that Mr. Maki testified to being
struck in the face hundreds of times, and that this is a common occurrence in a
professional hockey game).
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effect was warning Mr. Maki not to do what he had
done again. 139
It is apparent here that, a court may indulge a defendant who
plays within the rules and practices of the game, and as such
would achieve the same result under the American Rule, which
exempts otherwise criminal conduct in the same way so long as
the rules themselves are reasonable and consented to by all
engaged. Under the American Rule, violation of the rules of the
game could be construed to show negligence, but not enough
negligence to justify a criminal sanction. Likewise, adherence to
the rules should not necessarily shield an athlete from criminal
liability, if the rules themselves are objectively inadequate to rule
maintain a reasonably safe playing area.
Third, both defendants were acquitted in successive trials
and thus effectively limiting criminal prosecution to extreme
cases. 140 The cases were tried separately and the findings of facts
were mutually exclusive. This might be a problem in any
multiple prosecution arising out of a single or series of
transactions, but the fast and furious pace of competitive sport
combined with partisan fans may make for wide variance not
only in what is observed, but also in the significance of what is
observed. Of course, televised or photographed athletic events
lessens this problem, though it is well to remember that even
instant replay is not necessarily dispositive. It is both
interesting as well as appropriate that each Court seemed to
carefully craft its findings of fact to acquit the defendants
separately. It is appropriate that defendants receive a high
presumption of innocence with a wide margin of doubt. And,
quite apparently in the context of competitive contact sports, the
presumption of innocence and margin of doubt is hide and wide,
respectively.
139 Id.
140 See Gregory Schiller, Are Athletes Above the Law? From a Two-Minute Minor to a
Twenty-Year Sentence: Regina v. Marty McSorley, 10 SPORTS LAW. J. 241, 253 (2003)
(observing same court that dismissed charges against Mr. Maki also found that Mr.
Green's actions were instinctive and "protective in his own interests").
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II. TRADITIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: COMMON LAW OFFENSES AND
DEFENSES
The primary basis for criminal liability in competitive
sports argued for here is purposeful or knowing criminal conduct.
The primary legal bar to criminal liability is implied consent or
assumption of risk. Thus there are really two questions we seek
to answer in this Section. First, given that the intentional
exertion of brute force is a permissible intent in competitive
contact sports, when is the line crossed to a criminal misconduct.
Second, given the doctrines of implied consent and assumption of
risk, what, if any, risks are not inherent risks of the game or
what, if any, acts are different in kind from those for which
consent is implied?
A. Offenses
i. Simple Assault and Battery
The traditional offenses at Anglo-American common law
that might arguably apply to competitive contact sports include:
simple assault and battery as well as aggravated battery,
mayhem, intentional infliction of grievous bodily harm,
homicide, and attempts and conspiracies of same. Battery is an
unlawful application of force to the person of another; an
offensive touching of one's body.141 The common law elements of
battery include: 1) a force or touching, 2) caused by, 3) an
intentional or knowing act.142 Battery is a general intent
misdemeanor at common law. 143 Assault is also a general intent
misdemeanor at common law.144 There are two different forms
of assault recognized at common law. In the first form, the
majority rule, as recognized at common law, assault describes
the offense of unlawfully submitting one to the apprehension of
force or the person of another, i.e., an offensive touching of one's
141 See JOSHUA DRESSLER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 795 (3d ed.
1999) (defining battery as "any unlawful application of force to the person of another
willfully or in anger.").
142 See id.
143 See id. (finding that "[b]attery was a common-law misdemeanor").
144 See 6 AM. JUR., Assault and Battery, § 23 (2d ed. 2006) (observing that most
jurisdictions deem assault a general intent crime).
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mind.145 The elements of the first form are: 1) threatening
conduct, 2) with intent to injure or frighten the victim, 3) and
creates a reasonable apprehension of immediate physical
harm.146 Thus the first form of assault focuses on the effect on
the victims' state of mind. Under the first form, "present
ability" is irrelevant.14 7 Thus pointing a gun at someone who did
not know the gun was not loaded would still constitute an
assault because it places another in reasonable apprehension of
immediate physical harm. This reasonable apprehension makes
the lack of intent or ability to do a battery unimportant.
Under the minority rule, the second form of assault views
the offense as an attempted battery (or more realistically, a
battery that failed).148 This view of battery focuses on the mind of
the assailant-what was the intent-rather than that of the
harm to the victim. Under this second form, the assault requires
"present ability," since ability bears on the intent of the
perpetrator.1 49 Thus under the second form of assault pointing an
unloaded gun at one would not be an assault as such an act
would constitute an attempt of an attempt. The elements of the
second form of assault are simply: 1) threatening conduct, 2) with
intent to injure or frighten the victim. 150
Competitive contact sports are designed to involve
physical contact. Therefore if misdemeanor level assaults and
battery applied to competitive contact sports, all that would be
left to determine is whether the threatened touching or actual
touching is without consent or justification. Given the acceptable
level of high speed violence in competitive contact sports as well
145 See DRESSLER, supra note 141, at 795 (noting that the majority of jurisdictions
recognized that an action for assault could be maintained against one who intentionally
placed another in fear of bodily injury, even if he acted without any purpose or ability to
carry out the threat).
146 See id. (defining assault under first form as "intentional subjection of another to
reasonable apprehension of receiving a battery," including menacing, as well as actual
attempts to do physical harm to another).
147 See id. (pointing out that under first form of assault, an action could be
maintained against a defendant even if he acted without purpose or ability to carry out
threat).
148 See id. (stating that originally at common law, assault "was simply an attempt to
commit a battery.").
149 See id. (noting that "[u]nder such an approach, no assault would be committed if
the alleged assailant had no intent to injure or if his gun were unloaded.").
150 See id. (observing that under the second form of assault, most jurisdictions
described the offense as "an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a
violent injury on the person of another.").
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as the very imprecise assessment of risk, play within the rules
and practices of the game generally does, and should, provide a
safe harbor against minor injuries suffered from simple assaults
and batteries. 151
ii. Aggravated battery and mayhem
Aggravated batteries are simple batteries which are
aggravated by the increased incidence of injury or the special
status afforded the victim (such as hitting a police officer).152
Comparisons to the common law mayhem or maiming come
readily to mind. Mayhem was a general intent misdemeanor at
common law, except where it resulted in castration. 153 Mayhem
consists of a violently inflicted injury rendering the victim less
able to fight or annoy his enemy.154 Modern statutes retain this
offense, but no longer restrict it to injuries affecting the victim's
ability to defend him or herself.155 Mayhem is essentially a
battery aggravated by the intent to do grievous bodily harm. As
sports were originally a method to develop, and a way to test,
military prowess, mayhem, a battery aggravated by the intent to
do grievous bodily harm, provides a fitting precedent for a
modern day creation of a sports battery.
151 See, e.g., Regina v. Green, [1971] 16 D.L.R. (3d) 137 (Ont. Prov. Ct. 1970). Judge
Fitzpatrick, Provincial Court of Ottawa, Canada upon acquitting a hockey player for
battery stemming from a routine hockey fight in a National Hockey League exhibition
game, stated:
It is quite probable that in other circumstances and given other sets of facts a charge of
common assault might very well stand. However .... given the permissiveness of the
game and the risks that the players willingly undertake, I find it difficult to envision a
circumstance where an offence of common assault as opposed to assault causing actual
bodily harm could readily stand on facts produced from incidents occurring in the
course of a hockey game played at that level. Id.
152 See 6 C.J.S., Assault § 86 (2007) (defining aggravated assault as assault "which
has, in addition to the mere intent to commit it, another object which is also criminal").
153 See John F. Stinneford, Incapacitation Through Maiming: Chemical Castration,
The Eighth Amendment, and the Denial of Human Dignity, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 559, 595
(2006) (explaining mayhem by castration was more serious and was capital felony).
154 See id. at 594 (defining mayhem).
155 See Annemarie Bridy, Confounding Extremities: Surgery at the Medico-Ethical
Limits of Self-Modification, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 148, 153 (2004) (highlighting rationale
for mayhem is no longer interest in having body to fight with but in completeness of
body).
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iii. The Law of Homicides
The law of homicides describes the causal killing of
another. The various levels of homicide are separated only by
the mens rea or state of mind behind the actus reus or criminal
act. Proof of first degree murder requires: 1) An intent-to-kill
with malice aforethought homicide plus, 2) deliberation: i.e., a
cool mind that is capable of reflection and 3) premeditation:, i.e.,
that the cool mind did in fact reflect, at least for a short period of
time before the act of killing.156 Voluntary manslaughter is an
intentional killing under provocation or extreme emotional
distress.157  Thus, voluntary manslaughter includes all
intentional homicides which are committed with a person-
endangering-state-of-mind and are not justified or excused but
are perpetrated under circumstances of recognized mitigation.158
The mental state required to prove voluntary manslaughter
might have validity for grievous bodily injury intentionally
caused off the field, but as with murder, it would be difficult to
prove death as an intended result. Involuntary manslaughter at
common law consisted of an unintentional killing which results
from the negligent performance of a lawful act or the violation of
acts mala in se. 159 Criminal negligence (careless disregard of
information needed to act safely under the circumstances) is a
lesser mental state than criminal recklessness (careless
disregard of a known risk) and certainly a much lesser state than
criminal intent (knowing or purposely causing a harm).160
Although involuntary manslaughter is premised on a negligence
mental state, to safeguard against chilling legitimate competitive
zeal, the acceptable level of high speed violence in competitive
156 See Mitzi Dorland & Daniel Krauss, The Danger of Dangerousness in Capital
Sentencing: Exacerbating the Problem of Arbitrary and Capricious Decision-Making, 29 L.
& PSYCHOL. REV. 63, 78 n.109 (2005) (specifying deliberation with intent to kill and
premeditation are elements of first degree murder across jurisdictions).
157 See Myra E. Howard, State v. Counts: The Simultaneous Availability of the
Defenses of Insanity and Extreme Emotional Disturbance in Oregon, 71 OR. L. REV. 205,
210 (1992) (explaining that voluntary manslaughter is "intentional homicide committed
under the extenuating circumstance of 'heat of passion,' provocation, or extreme
emotional distress.").
158 See id. at 209-10 (noting killing is not excused but defense of extreme emotional
distress mitigates it to manslaughter).
159 See Sean J. Kealy, Hunting the Dragon: Reforming the Massachusetts Murder
Statute, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 203, 220 n.113 (2001) (defining involuntary manslaughter).
160 See Haeji Hong, Note, Hacking Through the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 1998
UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 5 (1998) (explaining levels of mens rea).
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contact sports, a conviction for involuntary manslaughter would
not be returned except for proof of purposeful or knowing
grievous bodily injury causing conduct leading to death. 161
Fatal injuries, life threatening injuries, or even grievous
bodily injuries leading to permanent disability are an
appropriate line which even the most violent of competitive
contact sports should not cross. It is difficult to conceive that the
vast number of boys and girls who aspire to sports stardom at
any level do so with the understanding that the sports activity
permits conduct that intends or unacceptably risks death or
grievous bodily injury. The uninterrupted advance of Anglo-
American law not only criminal law, but the law of torts,
including the rise of products liability, occupational safety
regulations, for example clearly trends toward prohibiting life
threatening, dangerous activity and otherwise imposing
innumerable safety constraints on necessary socially beneficial
life threatening activity.162 Against this trend, it cannot be
argued that the deterrent value of the criminal law has no
appropriate application to deter inherently dangerous activity
simply because such activity occurs in a sporting context. Nor
given the high financial and emotional stakes involved can one
safely assume that rational self-interest of the sporting
community makes criminal deterrence of life threatening actions
unnecessary. If for no other reason, the criminal law is
appropriately applied to competitive contact sports because the
inherently dangerous activity of sports is a lucrative playground
for criminal thugs the same as highly skilled dedicated athletes,
and assuming that we can distinguish the two, the latter deserve
protection from the former.
161 See generally Carolyn B. Ramsey, Homicide on Holiday: Prosecutorial Discretion,
Popular Culture, and the Boundaries of the Criminal Law, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1641, 1642
n.6 (2003) (highlighting that liability is only imposed on sports participant when he
intentionally injures another player or acts recklessly).
162 See generally Marc A. Franklin, Tort Liability for Hepatitis: An Analysis and a
Proposal, 24 STAN. L. REV. 439, 462 n.143 (1972) (noting that legislation banning
dangerous activity that society will not tolerate is appropriate remedy).
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B. Defenses
i. The Defense of Self Defense
The Maki163 case involved a hockey player who hit an
opposing player in the head with his stick during the course of a
hockey fight which interrupted play.164 Maki defended on the
basis of self-defense, which was codified under Section thirty-four
of the Ottawa Criminal Code.165 This statute requires a Court to
consider: 1) whether the accused was acting in self-defense, 2)
the reasonableness of the force used under the circumstances,
and 3) the state of mind of the accused.166 The Court acquitted
Maki finding that although he "fail[ed] to measure with nicety
the degree of force necessary to ward off the attack and inflict[ed]
serious injury thereby," nevertheless, the force used was not
disproportionate.167 Maki's acquittal on the defense of self-
defense was based upon a subjective analysis of the perception of
the accused rather than objective reality. The subjective analysis
in self-defense is becoming increasingly common in state
courts.168 Traditionally, self-defense was only available to those
who were objectively right in their actions. 169
ii. The Defense of Implied Consent
The doctrine of implied consent holds that one who
knowingly and voluntarily engages in risky social intercourse
consents to the risks inherent in the activity to which he has
joined.170 Implied consent is problematic for competitive contact
sports because of the ambiguity involving the rules and practices
of the game. Athletes may be expected to know the rules of the
game; it is a tenuous stretch to impose complete knowledge of the
163 Regina v. Maki, [1970] 14 D.L.R. (3d) 164, 164-65 (Ont. Prov. Ct. 1970).
164 See id.
165 See id. at 165.
166 See id.
167 See id. 166.
168 See id. at 167 (stating "each case must be decided on its own facts").
169 See B. Sharon Byrd, Till Death Do Us Part: A Comparative Law Approach to
Justifying Lethal Self-Defense by Battered Women, 1991 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 169,
172 (1991) (listing traditional objective elements of self-defense).
170 The doctrine of implied consent in criminal law closely equates to the doctrine of
assumption of risk in the law of torts only the mental state required for a crime requires a
much greater degree of culpability as measured by the risk and gravity of potential harm.
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practices of the game as well on athletes especially those athletes
not playing at the highest levels or who are relatively new to the
game. Further, although the rules are objective there is a
subjective element to applying the rules of the game. For
example, in the NFL, tackling a player by grabbing his face
mask, running into the punter, or tackling a quarterback after he
has thrown a pass is prohibited, but there is flagrant and
incidental contact version of each of these penalties.171 In short it
is not easy to identify with certainty inherent risks in the game
and the class of acts to which one actually consents or is
permitted to consent.
Regardless of ambiguity in drawing the boundaries of
implied consent, the law places limits as to what may tolerated
by either actual or implicit consent. The general rule in Anglo-
American law is that one can not give consent to having grievous
bodily harm or death inducing harm inflicted on his or her
person.172 Thus consent is only a defense to simple assault, not to
aggravated assaults leading to grievous bodily injury or death.
The application of this law is somewhat restrained in competitive
contact sports where promotion of the inherent values of sport
permit a greater degree of consensual harm to be inflicted. 173 An
established sports organization with proper equipment and rules
promoting safety provides serves just such a public interest in
sanctioning competitive contact sports.1 74
There are three problems with positing the doctrine of
implied consent as the death knell for criminal liability in
competitive contact sport. First, in an athletic contest, consent is
not expressly given and implied consent is imprecise. Second,
even if consent were expressly given in some binding contractual
171 See NFL.com, Digest of Rules, http://www.nfl.com/fans/rules (last visited Feb. 20,
2007).
172 See Kimberly A. Harris, Death at First Bite: A Mens Rea Approach in Determining
Criminal Liability for Intentional HIV Transmission, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 237, 248 (1993)
(noting Model Penal Code does not allow consent as defense in cases of serious bodily
harm).
173 See id. at 248 n.104 (stating Model Penal Code permits "consent as a defense to
serious bodily injury only where such injury is a 'reasonably foreseeable hazard' of
participation in sports or athletic contests").
174 Given the entertainment value of competitive contact sports, legislators generally
appear more than laxed in protecting athletes, but can be spurred to action after highly
publicized instances of grievous bodily harm or death occurs during play. Boxing is a good
example where congressional hearings spurred reform in the sports major sanctioning
bodies.
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way, the scope of the consent can not be determined since some
aspects of play are implicit. Third, there is no real definitive way
for an athlete to limit implied consent or opt out other than by
restricting play or giving up the game entirely.
In his Maki opinion, Judge Carter opined that had not the
defense of self defense been available, the defense of consent
would have failed.175 Judge Carter stated:
Although no criminal charges have been laid in the
past pertaining to athletic events in this country, I can
see no reason why they could not be in the future
where the circumstances warrant and the relevant
authorities deem it advisable to do so. No sports
league, no matter how well organized or self-policed it
may be, should thereby render the players in that
league immune from criminal prosecution. 176
In support of this position, Judge Carter quoted Judge Stephens
in Regina v. Coney, 177 who said:
In cases where life and limb are exposed to no serious
danger in the common course of things, I think that
consent is a defence [sic] to a charge of assault, even
when considerable force is used, as, for instance, in
cases of wrestling, single-stick, sparring with gloves,
football, and the like; but in all cases the question of
whether consent does or does not take from the
application or force to another illegal character, is a
question of degree depending upon circumstances.
... [T]here is a question of degree involved, and no
athlete should be presumed to accept malicious,
unprovoked or overly violent attack.
But a little reflection will establish that some limit
must be placed on a player's immunity from liability.
Each case must be decided on its own facts so it is
difficult, if not impossible, to decide how the line is to
be drawn in every circumstance. But injuries inflicted
in circumstances which show a definite resolve to
cause serious injury to another, even when there is
175 See Regina v. Maki, [1970] 14 D.L.R. (3d) 164, 167 (Ont. Prov. Ct. 1970).
176 Id.
177 [1882] 8 Q.B.D. 534, 549.
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provocation and in the heat of the game, should not
fall within the scope of implied consent. 178
What seemed clear to Judge Carter in Maki seemed just
the opposite to Judge Fitzpatrick in the Green case. Green
defended on grounds of consent. 179 Section 230 of the Criminal
Code as then written stated that: "A person commits an assault
when, without the consent of another person... (a) he applies
force intentionally to the person of the other, directly or
indirectly."18 0 Judge Fitzpatrick essentially took judicial notice
that:
[T]he players who enter the hockey arena consent to a
great number of assaults on their person, because the
game of hockey as it is played in the National Hockey
League... could not possibly be played at the speed at
which it is played and with the force and vigor with
which it is played, and with the competition that
enters into it, unless there was a great number of
what would in normal circumstances be called
assaults,- but which are not heard of. No hockey
player enters on to the ice of the National Hockey
League without consenting to and without knowledge
of the possibility that he is going to be hit in one of
many ways once he is on that ice.1S1
So where do you draw the line? Judge Fitzpatrick gave players
wide latitude reasoning that:
It is very difficult... for a player who is playing
hockey with all the force, vigour and strength at his
command, who is engaged in the rough and tumble of
the game, very often in a rough situation in the corner
of the rink, suddenly to stop and say, "I must not do
that. I must follow up on this because maybe it is an
assault; maybe I am committing an assault."18 2
178 Maki, [1970] 14 D.L.R. (3d) at 167.
179 Green, [1970] 16 D.L.R. (3d) at137-41 (discussing the fact that Green, a member of
the Boston Bruins, struck Maki, a member of the St. Louis Blues, in the head which was
followed up by a life-threatening blow by Maki to Green's head during an exhibition
hockey game in Ottowa, Canada 1969).
180 Id. at 140.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 141.
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Judge Fitzpatrick found credible Green's assertion that the
fracas started when Maki grabbed Green's sweater.18 3 He further
found that Green retaliated against Maki only after Maki
speared him in the groin area. 184 Judge Fitzpatrick stated that
Maki did not remember spearing Green, but did testify that if he
had speared Green he would expect that Green would
immediately retaliate.18 5 Judge Carter found Green to be the
initial aggressor in acquitting Maki; Judge Fitzpatrick found
Maki to be the aggressor in acquitting Green.18 6
iii. The Defense of Involuntary Reflex
The only reported case testing involuntary reflex as a
defense is State v. Forbes.87 This case involved two ice hockey
players who were both penalized by game officials. After coming
out of the penalty box, Dave Forbes beat Henry Foucha, an
opposing player until he suffered a fractured eye socket and
required twenty-five stitches to close facial cuts. 188 Local police
charged Forbes with aggravated assault by use of a dangerous
weapon. 189 At trial, Forbes raised the defenge of involuntary
reflex.190 The basis of this defense was that as an ice hockey
183 See Green, [1970] 16 D.L.R. (3d) at 141-42 (noting that Green, an experienced and
respected player, was in the best position to know whether Maki grabbed him by the
sweater).
184 See id. at 142 (finding that Green, after being speared by Maki in the groin, struck
Maki with a "half-chop" on the shoulder, warning Maki as a measure of self-defense).
185 See id. (stating that Maki initiated the fracas by way of the spearing to the groin
area).
186 See Maki, 14 D.L.R. (3d) at 166 (dismissing Maki's charge for not being able to
find that Maki intended to injure Green beyond a reasonable doubt); see also Green, 16
D.L.R. (3d) at 143 (explaining that, although the initial blow was the half-chop by Green
to Maki, the actual cause of the fight Maki's spearing of Green and thus Green's motion
was instinctive, discharged as a protective measure).
187 State v. Forbes, No. 63280 (Hennepin Co. Minn. Dist. Ct. dismissed Aug. 12,
1975).
188 See C. Antoinette Clarke, Article: Law and Order on the Courts: The Application of
Criminal Liability for Intentional Fouls During Sporting Events, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1149,
1179 n.199 (2000) (explaining how the butt end of Dave Forbes' hockey stick collided with
Henry Boucha's eye causing permanent damage); see also Walter Kuhlman, Violence in
Professional Sports, 1975 WIS. L. REV. 771, n.7 (1975).
189 See Clarke, supra note 182, at 1179 (describing charges as "aggravated assault by
use of a dangerous weapon."); see also Forbes, supra note 181 (stating the charges as
"Aggravated Assault, [pursuant to] Section 609.225, Subd. 2, Minnesota Statutes 1974.").
190 See Clarke, supra note 182, at 1179-80 (noting "jurors voting to acquit were
convinced that the social forces at work in the hockey community-acceptance of violence
and fighting-made the attack part of the game."); see also Yates & Gillespie, supra note
81, at 166-67 (2002) (discussion how in Forbes defendant argued "violence in sports starts
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players are trained from a very early age to use violence as part
of the game strategy, such violence when used is an instinctive
reflex lacking the necessary means rea for a criminal assault.191
The jury hung nine to three (9-3) to convict and the court
declared a mistrial.192 The prosecutor did not re-try the case.
Involuntary reflex is a defense because it is a non-act.
The common law required proof of an actus reus or "criminal act"
as the first predicate for the imposition of criminal liability. 193
Actus reus is a legal term of art. The classic definition of actus
reus is that it is a controlled movement, that is, a willed
movement.194 Control requires a human mental process
necessary to activate willed muscular movement, more
specifically, an intentional act.1 95 The fundamental predicate for
the imposition of criminal liability is the actus reus, which is the
criminal act.196 The theoretical significance for assigning this
important role to the actus reus owes to the assumption that an
at an early age and that the emotional nature of sports often induces players to lose
control.").
191 See Yates & Gillespie, supra note 81, at 166 (explaining involuntary reflex
doctrine).
192 See Kuhlman, supra note 182, at 772 n.10 (noting mistrial declared in Forbes due
to a hung jury); see also Clarke, supra note 182, at 1180.
193 See U.S. v. Parks, 411 F. Supp. 2d 846, 855 (S.D. Ohio 2005) ("An actus reus is
defined as 'a wrongful deed which renders the actor criminally liable if combined with
mens rea."') (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 36 (6th ed. 1990)) (italics in original); see
also ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 605 n. 1 (3d ed. 1989) ('It is
beyond contradiction that, regardless how heinous, no man can be convicted for having
criminal intent alone. An actus reus is essential."')(citing State v. Otto, 629 P.2d 646, 647
(1981)) (italics in original).
194 See PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 187, at 606 n.2 (quoting OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 54 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.) (1881)) (illustrating
Holmes' conception that an act is limited to the external manifestation of the actor's will,
i.e., the muscular contraction of "crooking" one's finger and that it is the surrounding
circumstances, i.e., "'a pistol loaded and cocked, and of a human being in such a relation
to [the pistol] to be manifestly likely to be hit, that make the act wrong."'); see also id. at
608 (noting that muscular control necessary to speak may be sufficient to constitute an
act) (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.3 Terroristic Threat Provision which provides for
criminal liability if a person "threatens to commit any crime of violence with purpose to
terrorize another").
195 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 2 cmt. a (1965) (stating "[tihere cannot be
an act without volition .... some outward manifestation of the defendant's will is
necessary to the existence of an act which can subject him to liability"); see also HOLMES,
supra note 188, at 54. Holmes notes that:
An act, it is true, imports intention in a certain sense. It is a muscular contraction,
and something more. A spasm is not an act. The contraction of the muscles must be
willed. And as an adult who is master of himself foresees with mysterious accuracy
the outward adjustment which will follow his inward effort, that adjustment may be
said to be intended. Id.
196 See supra note 187.
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act expresses the evil intent which the actor comes by on his or
her own free will. Thus utilizing actus reus as the first predicate
for assigning criminal liability serves the purpose of defensible
line drawing. In so doing, actus reus helps to preserve important
societal goals, namely primacy of individual liberty, by
minimizing arbitrary and capricious assessments of
criminality.197 Defining the actus reus in terms of a willed
movement, underscores both the theoretical and evidentiary
significance of the term. Because of its corporeal nature, the
actus reus serves an evidentiary role to demonstrate criminal
intent. 198 By providing concrete evidence of an intent to cause
harm, or, in the alternative, by giving concrete expression to evil
intent, the actus reus serves as a non-arbitrary marker between
criminal and non-criminal behavior as well as between evil
thought and evil action.199 Given the serious nature of the
criminal stigma and sanctions, line drawing in this arena should
be clear, definitive, and consistent. Non-arbitrary line drawing
in law, i.e., the task of separating law abiding citizens from those
held liable under the law is more critical in criminal law than in
intentional torts where the only consequence is the assignment of
financial responsibility for individual harm.
There is a difference between a reflex and "instinctive
behavior." The distinction is important since in the case of
instinct, the mind has grasped the situation and intentionally
197 Crimes which have a questionable actus reus component such as inchoate crimes,
possession crimes, and status crimes can lead to questionable convictions. This is evident
as where an alcoholic, unable to resist excessive consumption, satisfies the actus reus of
appearing in a public place notwithstanding being without the necessary volition. See
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 567-68 (1968) (Fortas, J., dissenting) (citing to Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962)). In Powell, the Supreme Court approved a Texas law,
which made being drunk in public a criminal offense. See Powell, 392 U.S. at 532, 535.
The Court argued that "in public" was adequate as an actus reus. See id. In Robinson,
however, the Court disapproved of a California statute which made being a drug addict a
criminal offense. See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 667. The Court in Robinson argued that the
California statute lacked an actus reus because a person could become an addict through
birth or forced consumption or could become an addict by virtue of acts in another state,
for which California would have no jurisdiction. See id.
198 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 2 supra note 189 (noting criminal liability
must be predicated on defendant's outward manifestation of his will as evidenced by some
act's existence); see also HOLMES, supra note 188, at 54 (explaining that willed muscular
movement is intent's external manifestation).
199 See sources cited supra note 187. Cf. Michael D. Paley, Note: Prosecuting Failed
Attempts to Fix Prices as Violations of the Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes: Elliot Ness is
Back!, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 333, 345 (1995) (discussing necessity of actus reus element to
draw line between criminal and non-criminal activity).
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dictated a course of action, whereas neural stimulants causing
reflexive behavior provide no basis for criminal intent.200 Once
the defense is properly understood, it is highly questionable
whether training to create a "learned response" might satisfy this
requirement of involuntary action as a defense. Thus the Forbes
case, like Maki and Green, reflects a resistance to applying the
criminal law to competitive contact sports in a straightforward
manner more than anything else. 201
III. FASHIONING A SPORTS BATTERY
A. Defining a Sports Mens Rea
i. Mens Rea: The Guilty Mind
Moral culpability is what primarily distinguishes a crime
from an intentional tort or an intentional breach of a contractual
duty. The notion that the criminal law is concerned with the
subjective mind manifested in a physical act or harmful result is
an advance in the common law, which owes to the influence of
canon law during the middle ages. 202 Under the influence of
canon law, the concept of criminality required not only physical
acts or harmful results, but also the concurrence of the guilty or
immoral mind with physical acts or harmful results. 203
Discernment of the guilty mind and defining crimes so that
200 See 1 W. LaFave & A. Scott, CRIMINAL LAW 4TH ED., § 3.2 at 199 (and cases cited
therein). Thus tort liability, concerned primarily with cost burdens, could be imposed on
the basis of mere reflex, but not criminal liability. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§2 cmt. a (1965) (characterizing reflexive behavior as including "knee-jerk[s] or the
blinking of the eyelids... or the convulsive movements of an epileptic .... [or]
movements of the body during sleep").
201 See generally State v. Forbes, No. 63280 (Hennepin Co. Minn. Dist. Ct. dismissed
Aug. 12, 1975) (reflecting resistance to applying criminal law to competitive contact
sports).
202 See Bruce R. Bryan, The Battle Between Mens Rea and the Public Welfare: United
States v. Laughlin Finds a Middle Ground, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 157, 162-63 (1995)
(discussing how melding of Roman and Canonical laws during Middle Ages birthed
concept actor's intent giving "moral significance to the act, thereby determining
culpability[,]" which has lead to continual recognition of mens rea requirement as "time-
honored principal of criminal jurisprudence.").
203 See Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of Motive
in the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 654-55 (1993) (noting
impact canon law had on development of criminal law and that "Saint Augustine was
apparently the first to employ the term mens rea to capture the notion that the moral
content of behavior cannot be assessed without attention to inner states").
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criminal elements, if proven accurately demonstrate non-
arbitrary evidence of a criminal mind beyond a reasonable doubt
is a major goal of the criminal law. 204
Proving an intangible thing such as a "guilty mind" is
easier said than done, especially where the standard of proof is
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Perhaps the day will come
when the advance of science and technology or some other
approach will allow for the discernment of thought patterns with
certitude. For now, we must rely on circumstantial evidence.
Circumstantial evidence can, and undoubtedly does, mean
differing things to different people. Reasonable doubt means a
doubt based upon reason-objective, logic-based reasoning, not
groundless speculation or, worse yet, ideologically based
reasoning reflecting political tribalism. 205 Even so, in a
heterogeneous society the standard of objective, logic-based
reasoning can never really be more than intelligence guided by
the experiences of each individual juror. People with differing
experiences applying the same objective rule of law will single
out different phenomena as constituting facts and will
impregnate those facts with differing categories of importance.
Hence the traditional goal of criminal law is not only to define
moral culpability, but to employ terminology that to the greatest
extent possible, minimizes the potential for interjecting bias and
prejudice into the evaluation of the defendant's mind set so as to
achieve consistent results.206 Once a criminal definition or term
is recognized as being ambiguous it must give way to more
precise terminology. Thus one important aim of traditional
criminal law is to reduce or eliminate the potential for untoward
204 See William A. Tilleman II, It's a Crime: Public Interest Laws (Fish and Game
Statutes) Ignore Mens Rea Offenses Towards a New Classification Scheme, 16 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 279, 289 (1989) (stating, "[t]o be convicted of a true criminal offense, the
prosecutor must convince the judge, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused had a
guilty mind[,]" and noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that "existence of a
mens rea is the rule.., rather than the exception" in criminal law).
205 See Christo Lassiter, The O.J. Simpson Verdict: A Lesson in Black and White, 1
MICH. J. RACE & L. 69, 101 (1996) (discussing meaning of reasonable doubt, stating that it
"means a doubt based upon reason" and that it should be objective and logic-based, rather
than based on speculation or "political simpatico").
206 See Paul H. Robinson, Legality and Discretion in the Distribution of Criminal
Sanctions, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 393-94 (1988) (recognizing uniqueness of criminal
law in that it only allows courts to impose sanctions when a defendant has violated a
precise and unambiguous written rule, which assures that legislative branch decides what
conduct should be criminal and limits the potential for abuse of discretion).
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human discretion in defining or applying legal terms, since such
discretion could be used as a tool of oppressive political bias,
which does no credit to criminal jurisprudence and the trial
process. 20 7 This is especially so in the highly partisan world of
sports. Historically, the criminal law pursued the goal of
precision even as societal mores changed with respect to crime
and punishment,208 and even as litigation gamesmanship altered
the balances intended by rules of substance and procedure.
Because the socio-economic and political matrix is ever changing,
grounding a sports mens rea consistent with the fundamental
principles of criminal law is absolutely critical to its application.
Mens rea is a legal term of art, which refers to the
cognitive mental component of crime. 209 Reflecting differing
historical traditions, mens rea is impregnated with a repository of
nuances of meaning. First, due to the influence of canon courts
and religious based scholarship, mens rea or scienter 21O referred
to the evilness or "actual wickedness" 211 of the actor. For
example, a person who harms another without excuse or
justification, exhibits moral depravity which constituted the
mens rea element. However, morally laden terms were subject to
wide variations in interpretation as inconsistent jury results
often made clear. 212
207 See Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96
MICH. L. REV. 1269, 1281 (1998) (examining criminal law's goal, noting that juries could
be given freedom to make "finer appraisals of blameworthiness under more general
standards," or be given greater discretion to decide who to punish or deter, but this is not
the case because the aim of criminal law is to punish only the individually blameworthy to
make certain "that outcomes appear consistent and not the product of prejudice,
sympathy, whim, or the art of jury selection, and to prevent false acquittals that reward
favored defendants or finessed defenses from becoming the order of the day to the
detriment of general deterrence goals and the respectability of criminal law itself.").
208 See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 535-36, (1968) (plurality opinion) (providing
"doctrines of actus reus, mens rea, insanity, mistake, justification, and duress have
historically provided the tools for a constantly shifting adjustment of the tension between
the evolving aims of the criminal law and changing religious, moral, philosophical, and
medical views of the nature of man.").
209 See 21 AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 126 (2006) (explaining elements of a crime,
mens rea being guilty mind that produces the act; the mental state which "expresses the
intent necessary for a particular act to constitute a crime.").
210 Scienter denotes guilty knowledge. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246,
252 (1952).
211 See HOLMES, supra note 188, at 75 (discussing mens rea as being synonymous
with "actual wickedness of the party").
212 See Kevin McMunigal, Rethinking Attorney Conflict of Interest Doctrine, 5 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 823, 842 (1992) (explaining term mens rea has such extensive verbiage
relating to it that it has become a source of ambiguity and confusion in criminal law since
there has been such great variety and disparity in its definition).
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Because at early common law all felonies were subject to
capital punishment, the common law judges seeking to avoid
harsh results became quite creative in making distinctions in
terms of moral culpability. 213 Their handiwork re-casts mens rea
as a reference to the mental ability or capacity of the actor for
forming either wicked or intentional acts. 214 Viewed as a matter
of capacity, mens rea speaks to sophistication of thought. The
codification of the common law crimes brought terms which were
more amenable to precise definition. Thus a third meaning of
mens rea refers to the intention or level of awareness that under
the circumstances in which an actor acts, harm is likely to occur
as a result of the contemplated action.215 There are three levels
of awareness relevant in evaluating the criminal mind:
awareness as to the nature of the conduct, 216 awareness as to the
nature of the harmful result, and awareness as to the existence
of a law prohibiting the conduct. 217
213 See John W. Poulos, The Supreme Court, Capital Punishment and the Substantive
Criminal Law: The Rise and Fall of Mandatory Capital Punishment, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 143,
147-48 (1986) (commenting on differences between American common law and English
common law and how beginning in 1794, states divided murder into separate offenses in
order tolimit death penalty's application to those where defendant is most morally
culpable); see also Stephen F. Smith, Proportionality and Federalization, 91 VA. L. REV.
879, 939 (2005) (discussing early English common law when almost all felonies were
capital offenses, noting "courts adopted interpretive strategies that would mitigate, not
exacerbate, the severity of the criminal sanctions that had been authorized by
Parliament.").
214 See Gardner, supra note 197, at 663 (proposing "mens rea as originally conceived
constituted a normative judgment of subjective wickedness, requiring not simply that
the;5074;5074 actor intend to commit the offense, but also that the offense be committed
by a responsible moral agent for wicked purposes."); see also Edward G. Mascolo,
Uncharged-Misconduct Evidence and the Issue of Intent: Limiting the Need for
Admissibility, 67 CONN. B. J. 281, 294 (1993) (noting English common law emphasis on
the mental element of crime requiring vicious or guilty mind because guilt arose from
offending actor's wicked intent; "if an individual lacked the mental capacity to form the
requisite evil intent, there could be no guilt.").
215 See Gardner, supra note 197, at 697 (discussing Model Penal Code's codification of
common law, where concept of mens rea as evil or wicked motive was abandoned for a
more structured system, which "links criminal liability to proof that the defendant
subjectively possessed a certain level of culpability" and the level entails "intentional
action coupled with awareness of the criminal consequences of the action under the
circumstances.").
216 See Poster 'N' Things, Ltd v. United States, 511 U.S. 513, 524 (1994) (stating,
conviction under Mail Order Drug Paraphernalia Control Act, 21 U.S.C. Section 857,
requires proof that defendant knowingly made use of interstate conveyance as part of
scheme to sell items he knew were likely to be used with illegal drugs; government need
not prove specific knowledge that items are "drug paraphernalia" within statute's
meaning).
217 See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 619 (1994) (finding conviction under
National Firearms Act, 26 U.S.C. Section 5861, which criminalizes possession of
unregistered "firearm," including a machinegun, which statute defines as a weapon that
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In the context of American football, for example, to show
criminality on the part of defensive tackle von Oelhoffen who
undertook to bring down quarterback Palmer, the prosecution
would need to show that von Oelhoffen knew or should have
known of the criminal prohibition against causing grievous bodily
injury or death; that von Oelhoffen purposefully or-as the
obvious purpose appears to be a legitimate attempt to thwart the
quarterback's efforts to pass-the more likely mental state is
knowingly-applied his brute strength, amplified by his bulk
weight, to bend the quarterback's lower leg against a knee joint
(conduct); and that serious knee injury would likely occur, since a
knee would buckle under such brute strength and weight
(result).218 The negation of purpose or knowledge as to the law,
conduct, or result would negate the required mental element and
render the crime of a sports battery incomplete. The argument
that this dynamic, competitive, contact sport is too fast for
thinking at any culpable state of awareness underestimates the
comfort level that well-trained and highly skilled professional
athletes ply their trade. As Cincinnati Bengal rookie cornerback
Jonathan Joseph offered, "[t]here are some rules that you just
automatically know you can't [break]. But the other knick-knack
rules, you just can't think about those, because it will slow you
down. And that's all within a second or two of getting a sack."2 19
It seems doubtful that players would be confused about the
extreme cases that would be so uniformly condemnable as to
garner widespread support for criminal prohibition.
ii. Formulation of Mens Rea Concepts at Common Law
General intent crimes refer to intentional acts done with
sufficient moral culpability to warrant criminal sanctioning.220
automatically fires more than one shot with a single pull of the trigger, requires proof
that defendant knew his rifle had characteristics that brought it within statutory
definition of machinegun).
218 See generally Poster 'N' Things, 511 U.S. 513 (asserting it is necessary to prove
defendant was aware as to conduct's nature); Staples, 511 U.S. at 619 (stating that it was
necessary to prove defendant was aware of existence of law prohibiting his conduct; in
this case, awareness that his gun possessed characteristics that would bring him within
statute's scope).
219 Kevin Kelly, Roughing Rules Not Easy On Defense, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Oct.
18, 2006 at C1.
220 See Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Federal Criminal "Code" is a Disgrace: Obstruction
Statutes as Case Study, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 643, 688 (2006) (finding 'general
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Here, moral culpability may be viewed as expressive of moral or
religious ethos or perhaps more neutrally in terms of societal
norms. The notion of generalized harm is beautifully expressed
in poetry:
I shot an arrow into the air,
It fell to earth, I knew not where;
For, so swiftly it flew, the sight
Could not follow it in its flight.221
Though the archer does not intend to injure with the shot into
the air, should the arrow strike a person, the archer would be
liable for a general intent crime. The arrow in flight is
essentially a general harm waiting for the world to unwittingly
produce the unintended victim. In the context of American
football, one who hurls himself entirely out of control at another
to make a tackle would evidence general intent were it not for the
field of play. Of course hurling oneself at the opponent to make a
tackle is often times the very essence of the sport and the players
wear protective gear. The exception is spearing or leading with
the helmet. Basing a sports battery on general intent would
clearly undermine the very essence of competitive contact sports.
This result is not warranted since serious injury seldom occurs
with the vast majority of contact in competitive contact sports.
Specific intent crimes, like general intent crimes, are
intentional acts done with sufficient moral culpability to warrant
criminal sanctioning, but in addition, specific intent means the
act is not only morally culpable, but is done with the objective of
accomplishing the particular harmful result to the particular
victim in the particular way in which the harm occurred. 222
Because of the added moral turpitude, capacity for thought, or
intent' meant that the crime required a mens rea in the culpability sense of a
blameworthy state of mind.").
221 HENRY WADSWORTH LONGFELLOW, The Arrow and the Song, in THE COMPLETE
POETICAL WORKS OF HENRY WADSWORTH LONGFELLOW 68 (H.E. Scudder, ed., Boston:
Houghton Mifflin Co. 1922), available at http://www.gutenberg.org/dirs/1/3/6/1365/
1365.txt.
222 See Derrick Augustus Carter, Bifurcations of Consciousness: The Elimination of
the Self-Induced Intoxication Excuse, 64 MO. L. REV. 383, 405 (1999) (guiding specific
intent requires "prosecution must prove not only that the accused did certain acts, but
that the accused accomplished the acts with the intent to cause a particular result."); see
also Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Punishing Hatred and Prejudice, 56 STAN. L.
REV. 1081, 1121, 1122 (2004) (defining specific intent crime one requiring defendant
tocommit prohibited action with some further purpose, beyond purpose to complete
prohibited act; one who acts with specific intention possesses desire that her actions will
result in particular state of affairs).
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sophistication of thought required to form and act on a specific
intent, specific intent is the appropriate level of mens rea to
definitively set a sport's battery apart from all but extreme cases
of competitive contact resulting in serious injury or death. 223
iii. The Model Penal Code Formulation of Mens Rea
In an attempt to replace moral ambiguity with more
rationally laden terms,224 the model penal code's [hereinafter
MPC] formulation of mens rea concepts provide for greater
differentiation of mental states. 225  The MPC formulation
replaces terms such as general intent and specific intent with a
hierarchy of four mental states. 226
MPC Section 2.02 General Requirements of
Culpability
(1) Minimum Requirements of Culpability. Except as
provided in Section 2.05, a person is not guilty of an
offense unless he acted purposely, knowingly,
recklessly or negligently, as the law may require, with
respect to each material element of the offense.
(2) Kinds of Culpability Defined.
(a) Purposely.
A person acts purposely with respect to a material
element of an offense when:
223 Diane V. White, Note, Sports Violence as Criminal Assault: Development of the
Doctrine by Canadian Courts., 1986 DUKE L.J. 1030, 1048 (1986) (discussing sports
violence and law that Canada has enforced, noting Canadian courts have recognized
"emotional intensity awakened during play may justify conduct that would not be
acceptable in calmer situations").
224 The drafters provide examples such as general criminal intent, mens rea, malice,
willfulness, and scienter. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 cmt. at 1 (1985).
225 See Hong, supra note 154, at 5 (noting Model Penal Code lists four distinct levels
of mens rea ranging from greater to less culpable, allowing for differentiation); see also
Miguel Angel Mendez, A Sisyphean Task: The Common Law Approach to Mens Rea, 28
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 407, 436 (1995) (stating Model Penal Code provisions went long way
toward resolving some of definitional uncertainties by redefining mens rea into discrete
mental states).
226 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962) (setting out purposely, knowingly,
recklessly, and negligently as the code's four culpable mental states).
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(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or
a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in
conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant
circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such
circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.
(b) Knowingly.
A person acts knowingly with respect to a material
element of an offense when:
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or
the attendant circumstances, he is aware that his
conduct is of that nature or that such circumstances
exist; and
(ii) if the element involves a result of his conduct, he is
aware that it is practically certain that his conduct
will cause such a result.
(c) Recklessly.
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material
element of an offense when he consciously disregards
a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material
element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that, considering
the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct and the
circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a
gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a
law-abiding person would observe in the actor's
situation.
(d) Negligently.
A person acts negligently with respect to a material
element of an offense when he should be aware of a
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material
element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk
must be of such a nature and degree that the actor's
failure to perceive it, considering the nature and
[Vol. 22:1
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purpose of his conduct and the circumstances known
to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of
care that a reasonable person would observe in the
actor's situation.227
The MPC formulation indicates a shift from terms that
describe a moral element of mens rea to terms that describe the
defendant's level of awareness. The MPC definition of 'purpose'
corresponds loosely with the common-law concept of specific
intent, while 'knowledge' corresponds loosely with the concept of
general intent."228 Yet some ambiguity remains in the terms
"knowledge" and "recklessness."229 Some courts have construed
both terms to evidence a general intent,230 while still others have
interpreted both to satisfy specific intent requirements. 231
iv. Selecting a Workable Mens Rea for a Sports Battery
The Restatement of Torts suggests that assault and
battery is the most likely civil claim arising out of sports. 232 If
read broadly, each state has a battery provision in which
227 Id.
228 U.S. v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 405 (1985) (citing W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK
ON CRIMINAL LAW §28 at 201-02 (1972)).
229 See id. at 404 (discussing important distinctions between mental states of purpose
and knowledge, but failing to discuss reckless and negligent in the same way).
230 See Bailey, 444 U.S. at 405 (noting knowledge corresponds to common law concept
of general intent (citing W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 28, at
201-02 (1972))); Watson v. Dugger, 945 F.2d 367, 370 (11th Cir. 1991) (stating "general
intent crimes ... require some showing of culpability, either knowing, reckless, or
negligent, rather than intentional, action.") (citing P. LOWE, J. JEFFRIES, JR., & R. BOONE,
CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 232 (1982)); Gasser v. Morgan, 498 F. Supp. 1154,
1163 (N.D. Ala. 1980) (positing 'general intent' means... 'recklessly doing the physical
act which the crime requires"') (quoting W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL
LAW §45 at 343-44 (1972)).
231 See U.S. v. Boyer, 694 F.2d 58, 59 (3d Cir. 1982) (affirming "specific intent to
deceive may be found from a material misstatement of fact made with reckless disregard
of the facts"); U.S. v. Barclay, 560 F.2d 812, 815 n.2 (7th Cir. 1977) (explaining specific
intent is satisfied if it can be established defendant knowingly committed act forbidden by
law, or knowingly failed to act where law requires action (quoting La Buy Section 4.04 33
F.R.D. at 550-51)).
232 The Restatement defines battery as harmful or offensive contact with another
person stemming from intent to make such contact or create immanent apprehension of
such contact. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 18 (1965). The Restatement says
that one is subject to liability for assault if they act intending to cause a harmful or
offensive contact with the person of another, or an imminent apprehension of such
contact, and such imminent apprehension results. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 21 (1965). In contact sports, players continuously make "harmful" contact with their
opponents, and this is almost always accompanied by an "imminent apprehension" on
behalf of the one being hit, at least where he sees the hit coming. Therefore, it logically
follows that battery and assault would be the most likely civil claims arising out of sports.
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criminal thuggery masquerading as sport might fall, but actual
criminal liability would depend on whether a court would apply
the statute to sports. Iowa has a statutory provision, which
creates a sports exception for assault when a person voluntarily
participates in a sport and such act (assault) is a reasonably
foreseeable incident of such a sport or activity and it does not
create an unreasonable risk of serious injury or breach of
peace. 233 Only Wisconsin, has a statute which specifically
addresses the liability of contact sports participants in
recreational activities in tort.234 The Wisconsin statute provides
for civil liability.235 However, as civil battery differs from
criminal battery only by the requisite state of mind in which the
battering act occurs, the Wisconsin statute provides a useful
starting point for analysis.
Liability of contact sports participants. (a) A
participant in a recreational activity that includes
physical contact between persons in a sport involving
amateur teams, including teams in recreational,
municipal, high school and college leagues, may be
liable for an injury inflicted on another participant
during and as part of that sport in a tort action only if
the participant who caused the injury acted recklessly
or with intent to cause injury. (b) Unless the
professional league establishes a clear policy with a
different standard, a participant in an athletic activity
that includes physical contact between persons in a
sport involving professional teams in a professional
league may be liable for an injury inflicted on another
participant during and as part of that sport in a tort
action only if the participant who caused the injury
acted recklessly or with intent to cause injury.236
As recognized in the statute's deference to a professional league
that establishes a policy with a different standard, a call for a
233 See I.C.A. § 708.1 (2004).
234 See Wis. STAT. § 895.525 (4m) (2006) (creating potential civil liability for amateur
sport participants who injure other participants during play and applying similar rules to
professional sports unless the professional league "establishes a clear policy with a
different standard").
235 See id. (imposing civil liability upon sport participants who injure other
participants during play, but only if they act recklessly or with intent to injure).
236 Id.
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criminal law of sports must be heard by the federal government
given the interstate commercial character of sports leagues.
Substituting purpose or knowing mental states for their civil
analogs in tort law, the Wisconsin statute works for criminal
purposes. The gravamen of such a sports battery offense is
protection of athletic autonomy to play the game regardless of
competitive sport intensity. Purpose identifies the mental state
when players enter the field for the sole or primary reason or
goal to cause grievous bodily injury or death to another without
regard for any legitimate sporting objective. Knowing identifies
the mental state when players seek to accomplish a legitimate
sporting objective, but do so in a way that they know or should
know will cause serious bodily injury or death to another player.
As previously argued the temptation to lower the
criminally sanctionable mental state to criminal recklessness
should be resisted. Players who come barreling in out of control
may very well do so recklessly and in a perfect world, we might
consider out-of-control tactics as sufficing to prove criminal
recklessness. However concern that overzealous prosecution
might chill legitimate competitive zeal cautions against crafting
standards to catch any but the clearly worst offenders at the
extreme end of misconduct. The rules of the game and the
fostering of safe practices should be adequate to shield
competitors from out-of-control tactics.
In the final analysis, the introduction is overdue of a
federal sports battery statute precisely limited to situations in
which purposeful or knowing criminal misconduct during play
leads to grievous bodily injury or death. Whether the criminal
misconduct occurs during play or out of play should not be a
conceptual barrier as long as a prosecutor can demonstrate a
criminal mind.
B. Proving a Sports Mens Rea
The second great task after defining mens rea is proving a
mens rea by reference to, and inference from, harm causing
conduct. The task is to set out knowable objective principles to
prescribe the actions causing death or serious injury. The best
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way to start is with examples of criminal thuggery masquerading
as legitimate sport.
i. Spoken Intent
a. Sending a Message as Motive
During the Athletic 10 Conference Basketball
Tournament Play in February 2005, NCAA Men's Basketball
Hall of Fame Coach John Chaney, while coaching at Temple
University, put in seldom used 6-foot-8, 250 pound Nehemiah
Ingram, a self-described, "goon" to "send a message" by delivering
hard fouls against Saint Joseph's University.237 Chaney was
angry at what he thought were illegal screens by the opposition
team. 238 Ingram responded by fouling out in four minutes, but
not before thwarting a lay-up attempt by John Bryant with a
hard elbow that sent Bryant crashing to the floor, breaking his
arm and ending his season. 239 The referee actuaily allowed
Ingram to continue play until he accumulated five fouls
necessary to compel a player's exit from the game. The referee
237 See ESPN.com, Longtime Temple Coach Chaney Retires, Mar. 13, 2006,
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/news/story?id=2366357 (reporting that coach Chaney
inserted "goon" Nehemiah Ingram into game in order to commit hard fouls); Phil Taylor,
The Blame Game: Administrators Shouldn't be Silent in Chaney Saga, Mar. 2, 2005,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2005/writers/phil-taylor/03/02/chaneyindex.html
(describing how Chaney sent Ingram in to even score by committing hard fouls);
ESPN.com, Chaney Sent Player in to Foul, Feb. 28, 2005, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/
news/story?id=1999665 (stating that Chaney put Ingram in game to "send a message");
Can't Stop the Bleeding, Chaney Melts Down, Suspends Self, Feb. 24, 2005,
http://www.cantstopthebleeding.com/?p=1148 Feb. 24, 2005 (explaining how Chaney sent
in Nehemiah Ingram to provide some "rough justice" and quoting Chaney as saying, "I'm
sending a message .... And I'm going to send in what we used to do years ago-send in
the goons.").
238 See Longtime Temple Coach Chaney Retires, supra note 231 (reporting that
Chaney decided to send Ingram in "because he thought the Hawks were using illegal
screens"); Chaney Sent Player in to Foul, supra note 231 (stating that Chaney sent
Ingram in after becoming "angered by what he thought were illegal screens by Saint
Joseph's").
239 See Longtime Temple Coach Chaney Retires, supra note 231 (noting that John
Bryant broke his arm after being knocked out of the air by Ingram); Taylor, supra note
231 (describing how "Ingram dutifully did what Chaney told him, elbowing one Owl in the
head and sending another, senior John Bryant, flying on a layup attempt" and further
explaining that "Bryant broke his arm on the landing, which sideline[d] him for the final
games of his college career."); Chaney Sent Player in to Foul, supra note 231 (pronouncing
"Ingram fouled forward John Bryant hard, sending him sprawling to the ground and
breaking his arm."); see also Can't Stop the Bleeding, Chaney Melts Down, Suspends Self,
supra note 231 (exclaiming "Ingram hit everything that moved and fouled out in 4
minutes").
LEX SPORTIVA
awarded neither technical fouls nor otherwise acted to limit
Ingram's harm producing behavior. 240 Coach Chaney apologized
and suspended himself for the remainder of the season.241
Temple University and the Athletic 10 Conference in which
Temple University played, agreed with the suspension.242 Other
than the foul assessed by the referee, Nehemiah Ingraham
received no administrative sanction because he was just
following orders. 243 If the defense of just following orders is a
defense at all, it is so only to the extent that the orders given are
lawful and reasonable. John Bryant did not initiate legal
proceedings in his own behalf. Ingraham's attacks masquerading
as fouls were not reasonable and had they occurred off the court
they would amply demonstrate intentional criminal misconduct.
b. Retaliation as Motive
In 1999, the ace pitcher for the Wichita State Shockers
baseball team Ben Christiensen intentionally threw a pitch at
lead off hitter Anthony Molina as he took warm up swings
between innings. 244 It is an unwritten rule in baseball that a
warm up batter should not "time-up" a pitcher by standing close
to the plate during warm ups. 24 5 Molina was within 20 feet of
home plate when he was hit in the eye. 246 As a result of being hit
by the pitch Molina suffered broken facial bones and
permanently damaged vision. 247 The Wichita State pitching
240 Contra Can't Stop the Bleeding, Chaney Melts Down, Suspends Self, supra note
231.
241 But see Taylor, supra note 231 (illustrating how Chaney apologized and imposed
suspension upon himself, which university later extended after Bryant's fracture was
revealed); Chaney Sent Player in to Foul, supra note 231 (reporting that Chaney
apologized and suspended himself for one game, but was suspended for rest of season by
the university).
242 See Chaney Sent Player in to Foul, supra note 231 (claiming that Temple's
president announced suspension and Atlantic ten Conference supported the president's
decision and refused to impose further sanctions).
243 See id (explaining that although Saint Joseph's wanted conference to punish
Ingram, officials refused to do so stating, "[b]ecause Nehemiah was instructed to commit
the hard fouls, we found fault with coach Chaney, not Nehemiah").
244 See Carol Slezak, Molina Still Isn't in Celebratory Mood, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES,
May 11, 2004, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-qn4155/
is_20040511/ain12547507 (depicting the events the incident); see also Jim Callis, Molina
Settles with Christensen, Feb. 5, 2002, http://www.baseballamerica.com/today/news/
020205christensen.html (describing the beaming incident).
245 See Callis, supra note 243; see also Slezak, supra note 243.
246 See Callis, supra note 243; see also Slezak, supra note 243.
247 See Callis, supra note 243; see also Slezak, supra note 243.
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coach admitted that he coached his pitchers to brush back hitters
in that situation.248 In the vernacular, the pitching coach would
tell the pitcher to "put it in his ear." The beaning was clearly
intentional and Molina at least filed a civil suit, which the
parties settled out of court. 249 Christianson was a first round
draft pick that year and signed for over $1 million.2 50
New York Yankees pitcher Roger Clemens hurled not only
fastballs, but intimidating brush back pitches as well as multiple
insults at New York Mets catcher Mike Piazza in interleague
play. 251 In the summer of 2000, Clemens hit Piazza in the head
with a fastball; Piazza, felt the beaning was intentional. 252 In the
2000 World Series, Clemens threw part of a splintered broken
bat at Piazza during one of Piazza's at bats against Clemens. 253
But, because Clemens pitched in the American league, where the
designated hitter rule allows pitchers to opt out of exposure at
the plate, Piazza would have to wait until Clemens played an
interleague series with the Mets to get his revenge. In 2002,
Clemens pitched against the Mets at Shea Stadium and would be
forced to bat.254 The New York media interest was intense as to
248 See Callis,,supra note 243; see also Carl Bialik, Don't You Dare Time My Pitches,
YALE HERALD, http://www.yaleherald.com/archive/xxviii/1999.09.03/sports/p25bialik.html
(last visited Feb. 26, 2007) (pitching coach told Christensen to throw at Molina).
249 See Bialik, supra, note 247; see also Callis, supra note 243.
250 See Slezak, supra note 243.
251 See Dave Anderson, The Headliners of 2000; Big Money, a Broken Bat, and a
Wonder Named Woods, NY TIMES, Dec. 31, 2000, at 8-1 (reporting Clemens gave Piazza
concussion by hitting him in the head with brush back pitch earlier in season and hurled
splintered bat fragment in Piazza's direction during World Series); Dan Barry, Subway
Series; A Big Fantasy Camp Suddenly Evaporates, NY TIMES, Oct. 28, 2000, at D-1
(describing Clemens' bat fragment throwing incident and earlier beaning incident).
252 See Anderson, supra note 241 (asserting Clemens hit Piazza's helmet with pitch
during regular season); Barry, supra note 238 (explaining Piazza suffered concussion
after being hit in head by Clemens pitch earlier in year); Jack Curry, Piazza Hurt; Mets
Furious, NY TIMES, July 9, 2000, at 8-2 (stating "92-mile-an-hour fastball hit the NY on
the front of Mike Piazza's batting helmet, making an ugly sound and causing Piazza to
tumble to the dirt like a mannequin. Piazza could not avoid Roger Clemens's pitch, and he
lay motionless."); see also Tyler Kepner, Hampton and the Mets Get Tough and Then Get
Even; Groggy and Angry, Piazza Rips Clemens, NY TIMES, July 10, 2000, at D-1 (referring
to Clemens beaning incident and reporting that Piazza said, "I thought it was definitely
intentional").
253 See Anderson, supra note 241 (describing how Clemens threw a piece of Piazza's
shattered bat in the batter's direction near the first base line); Barry, supra note 238
(reporting Clemens received $50,000 fine for fielding jagged piece of Piazza's broken bat
and tossing it in Piazza's direction).
254 See Rafael Hermoso, Clemens is Hit, But it Isn't With a Pitch, NY TIMES, June 16,
2002, at 8-1 (recounting match up between Mets pitcher Shawn Estes and Roger Clemens
during June 15, 2002 inter-league game between the Yankees and the Mets, Clemens's
first at-bat against the Mets since 2000 World Series).
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whether Mets pitcher Shawn Estes would hit Clemens during his
first at bat to avenge the beaning of Piazza. Fearing
suspensions, the Mets locker room did not overtly state that
Estes would hit Clemens. However, Mets GM Steve Phillips said
the issue was "unresolved" making it clear that the Mets
intended to follow the baseball tradition of retaliation. 255
In Clemens' first at bat, pitcher Estes threw the first pitch
a foot behind Clemens, a pitch so far off its mark there was no
doubt its intentions. 256 Estes was maligned not for attempting to
bean Clemens, but instead for not hitting Clemens.257 Former
pitcher Rob Dibble stated that the Mets "sent a boy to do a man's
job," and that "had [Estes] knocked down Clemens or hit him in
the numbers, I wouldn't have had to criticize him on
SportsCenter and Baseball Tonight."258 Estes, many argued,
should have made Clemens either eat dirt or the ball. Instead,
Estes intentionally attempted to hit Clemens, but made sure that
his attempt was wild. 259 The Ben Christensen incident and
subsequent exposure to civil liability may have been a factor in
Estes' mind. This scenario provides an opportunity to make a
worthwhile distinction. On the one hand, if Estes had beaned
Clemens causing grievous bodily injury or death, the location of
the pitch, the obligations of loyalty to a teammate, and media
focus leading up to the confrontation, and most importantly
baseball's unwritten rule of retaliation, would have shown the
calculated steps and mens rea necessary for a criminal
prosecution. Attempting, but failing, to hit a player in the head
with a hard fastball would arguably constitute an attempted
sport battery as described herein. On the other hand, given
Estes' skill level and his obvious decision to scare, but not hit,
255 See Rafael Hermoso, The Subject is Clemens, But Piazza Won't Bite, NY TIMES,
June 15, 2002, at D-3 (quoting Phillips as saying that Piazza-Clemens issue was
"unresolved").
256 See ESPN.CoM, Mets Tag Clemens for Pair of Homers, June 15, 2002,
http://espn.go.com/mlb/news/2002/0615/1395313.html (reporting that Estes threw eighty-
seven mph fastball behind Clemens).
257 See id.
258 See Craig Calcaterra, Rob Dibble's Dubious Code of Honor, BULL MAG., June 22,
2002, http://www.bullmag.com/view.php?ai=44 (quoting Dibble's comments on Sports
Center); see also Rob Dibble, Estes Missed on Message, June 19, 2002,
http://espn.go.com/talent/danpatrick/s/2002/0617/1395889.html (responding to his own
comments on Sports Center, and streaming video of Dibble's comments).
259 See Mets Tag Clemens for Pair of Homers, supra note 250 (stating pitch was
extremely wild).
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Clemens, the better argument is to forego a criminal charge. The
argument is that Estes only intended to scare, but not hit
Clemens. 260 A second argument is that a rush to criminal
judgment on "wild" pitches overstates the ability to clearly draw
the line between criminal and non-criminal misconduct. Afterall,
is pitchers could always put the ball exactly where they intended,
there would be fewer walks and home runs. The counter-
argument is that a criminal charge, even if not carried through to
fruition is the fastest way to end the dangerous tradition of
brushbacks.
Nehemiah Ingram, Shawn Estes, and Ben Christiensen
each purposely caused or attempted to cause grievous bodily
injury risking death to accomplish a competitive objective. 261
Each did so within the confines of the rules and practices of the
game. The rules and practices of the game seem imminently
reasonable to sports-minded people. In competitive basketball,
aggressive body contact impeding the sporting objective of an
opponent is a violation of the rules. In any activity besides
competitive contact sports, such as Christmas shopping, for
example, in rushing to get the last available "must have" gift of
the season, purposely elbowing a competitor to the floor would be
grounds for criminal prosecution. 2 6 2 There is even less body
contact in baseball than basketball; other than tagging a runner
with the ball, the rules of the game do not call for contact at all.
Yet in any activity besides competitive contact sports, throwing
baseball sized objects at others would be considered criminal
activity.2 6 3 If there is clear evidence of purposeful or knowing
260 See id.
261 See Callis, supra note 243 (reporting Christianson's throw at Molina); Mets Tag
Clemens for Pair of Homers, supra note 255 (reporting Estes beaming attempt); see also
Bob Kovack, Cheney, Temple and the A- 10 All Drop the Ball,
http://www.geoclan.com/sports/articles/O5/ktakes/KovacksTakesSeasonl5.htm (last visited
Feb. 26, 2007) (reporting incident when Ingrahm broke another player's arm).
262 See MSNBC.CoM, PlayStation 3 Debuts in US Amid Long Lines, Nov. 17, 2006,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15754452/ (describing intense fighting in US debut of Play
station three gaming system); see also Peter Svenson, Violence Mars PlayStation 3
Launch, USA TODAY, Nov. 18, 2006, available at http://www.usatoday.comltechlgaming/
2006-11-18-ps3-violencex.htm (describing violence that erupted during debut of
PlayStation 3 videogame system).
263 Chicago Cubs pitcher Jae-kuk Ryu aimed for and knocked an osprey from its
perch, killing it with a baseball. See WORLDNETDAILY.COM, Baseball: Wild(life) Pitch
Under Investigation - Minor League Cubs Player Strikes Out At Osprey In Nest, April 23,
2003, http://www. worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLEID=32207. Officials with
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intent, it is appropriate to proscribe the misconduct by initiating
a charge of sports battery, or aggravated battery, or homicide
depending upon the level of harm inflicted.
ii. Actions beyond the pale
Actions beyond the pale are those which are so far
removed from the rules and practices of the game that there it
was never thought necessary to prohibit the action. 264 Perhaps
the best example, as well as the scariest incident in the history of
the National Basketball Association occurred on December 9,
1977 between Rudy Tomjanovich of the Houston Rockets and
Kermit Washington of the Los Angeles Lakers. 265 After a
Houston basket, a slight tussle broke out among opposing
players, which continued as the players ran to the opposite end of
the court. Tomjanovich ran slightly behind Washington. As he
approached, Washington suddenly turned and with arm fully
extended, punched Tomjonovich in the face.266 The injury nearly
shattered his face leaving him in a pool of blood and nearly
killing Tomjanovich. 267 The injury required five surgeries and
ended Tomjanovich's playing career.268  The NBA fined
Washington $10,000 and suspended him sixty days without
pay. 269 This incident led to the NBA instituting a flagrant foul
rule.270  Of criminal response there was none; nor civil
the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission sought criminal charges, noting
that wounding or killing an osprey is a second-degree misdemeanor, punishable by a fine
up to $500 and 60 days in jail. Id. In 1983, New York Yankee star outfielder Dave
Winfield also received public condemnation for throwing a baseball at a sea gull that hit
and killed the bird while in Toronto. See WIKIPEDIA.ORG, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki
DaveWinfield (last visited Feb. 28, 2007).
264 Beyond the pale is an idiom that generally means to go beyond traditional rules or
boundaries such that the action is unacceptable or unreasonable. See
THEFREEDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/pale (last visited Feb. 28,
2007).
265 See Brooks Marlin, The Punch: Kermit Washington vs. Rudy Tomjanovich,
http://everything2.comlindex.pl?nodeid=1376655 (last visited Feb. 28, 2007) (depicting
incident's events); see also David L. Moore, New Start From Old Wounds, Nov. 26, 2002,
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/ccovtue.htm (discussing Kermit Washington's attack on
Rudy Tomjonovich).
266 See Marlin supra note 259; see also Moore, supra note 259.
267 See Marlin supra note 259; see also Moore, supra note 259.
268 See Marlin supra note 259; see also Moore, supra note 259.
269 See Marlin supra note 259; see also Moore, supra note 259.
270 The flagrant foul rule was instituted in the 90's. See WIKIPEDIA.COM,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilFlagrantfoul (last visited Mar. 5, 2007). Most NBA rules
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prosecution for that matter. The most interesting factoid about
this incident is not its plainly deliberative nature, but that
players who engaged in such criminal conduct were well known
as "the enforcers."271 Where there is clear evidence of purposeful
or knowing intent such as punching an opponent in the face on
the return up court away from the ball, it is appropriate to
proscribe the misconduct by initiating a criminal charge of sports
battery or aggravated battery or homicide depending upon the
level of harm inflicted.
CONCLUSION
Competitive contact sport injuries can be, and often are,
serious. Statistically, major injuries are inevitable due to
excessive risk inherent in competitive contact sports. But at the
end of the day, athletes generally expect to walk away from the
field of sport in substantially the same condition as when they
walked on the field of play. Purposeful or knowing strategic acts
to cause grievous bodily injury for a competitive advantage is a
different matter. Surely the criminal law applies to on-field
misconduct the same as off-field misconduct. The English Rule
looks to evaluate mens rea but allows a high presumption of
innocence for players acting within the rules and custom of the
game. Under the American Rule players consent to risks
inherent in the rules and custom of the game and so long as the
rules are reasonable, there is no criminal liability for accidents,
and injury is excused. Neither legal tradition nor the rules of the
games adequately address strategic acts of criminal thuggery
masquerading as legitimate sport. The contemporary incidents
reviewed in this article should spur thoughts toward developing a
criminal jurisprudence to address intentional or reckless actions
causing grievous bodily injury on the playing field. The goal of
lex sportiva is that no athlete should have to suffer purposeful or
about fighting grew out of this incident according to Moore and Marlin articles above, but
not the flagrant foul rule, which has nothing to do with fighting, but hard fouls. See id.
271 See Jayda Evans, Enforcers a Rarity in Today's NBA, Feb. 2, 2007, available at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/sports/2003552391-enforcersO2.html (discussing
rough play of NBA players who played the enforcer role on teams); see also Laura Kurz,
"Where Are They Now?" - Kermit Washington, June 23, 2006, https://www.nbrpa.com/
news/wherenow/ kermit washington.aspx (stating Kermit Washington was known as
NBA enforcer).
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knowing thuggish attacks masquerading as legitimate play. The
law that must catch up. This is inevitable. If it was inevitable
that the Geneva Conventions would develop rules governing war
beyond legitimate war aims, then a fortiori there must be a
convention to develop rules governing competitive contact sport
(simulated war) beyond legitimate sports aims.

